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ABSTRACT 
 
Federal appellate courts have significant discretion to set the internal 
policies that govern the appeals process, and they have used that discretion 
to institute policies designed to combat increasing caseloads.  This Article 
takes a close look at one such policy:  early announcement of panel 
composition in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  In stark contrast to every 
other circuit, the D.C. Circuit announces panel composition to litigants in 
civil appeals well in advance of oral argument, and it does so at least in part 
to encourage settlement and control the court’s workload.  This Article 
concludes that although there are indications that the policy is serving its 
intended purpose, the effect is far from dramatic.  To understand the limited 
effect, the Article first considers various barriers created by the content of 
the court’s cue and by the ways that litigants respond to that content.  The 
Article then explores how those barriers might alter the pool of cases that 
proceed to a merits decision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past quarter century, the United States Courts of 
Appeals have been experiencing a well-publicized caseload crisis.2  
Filings increased from 47,000 in 1992 to almost 68,500 in 2005 while 
the number of authorized judges has remained constant.3 Unlike the 
Supreme Court, which by virtue of its discretionary jurisdiction4 has a 
highly effective internal mechanism for regulating its workload,5 the 
appellate courts are in many respects powerless to combat the rising 
tide. Instead, their primary source of relief is legislative action, 
through measures like the tightening of jurisdictional requirements6 
                                                          
2 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 
59-93 (1985); Martin J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of 
the Federal Courts, 1996 WISC. L. REV. 11, 25-26 (1996) (discussing federal 
caseload crisis); Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: 
Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1485, 
1487-91 (1995) (same).  
3 Appellate Judicial Caseload Profile, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/cmsa.pl. 
4 Although not unlimited, the Supreme Court has significant ability via the writ 
of certiorari to control the cases it hears. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion Revisited. 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1896 -1900 (2004); David L. 
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985). 
5 The Supreme Court’s discretion to accept cases has resulted in a substantial 
decline in the number of published opinions in the last 60 years. See, Richard A. 
Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV 31, 66 (2005). 
6 Between 1935 and 1981, at least sixty-four bills were introduced that proposed 
stripping federal jurisdiction over various categories of cases and recently Congress 
has debated four new bills limiting or removing jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Travis Christopher Barham, Congress Gave and Congress Hath Taken Away: 
Jurisdiction Withdrawal and the Constitution, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1143-
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and the addition of new judicial positions.7  No such measure has been 
used sufficiently to overcome the increases in case filings, and other 
legislative action has effectively counteracted their limited use.8
 The lack of direct methods of caseload control has not stopped 
the appellate courts from taking various steps to address the problem.  
In recent years, most appellate courts have instituted or enhanced their 
mediation and settlement programs in an effort to remove cases from 
the docket9; many have increased their use of unpublished opinions to 
dispose of cases with greater efficiency10; and some have aggressively 
promoted arbitration as an alternative to litigation.11   
                                                                                                                                         
1148 (2005).  Many of these bills were motivated by political considerations rather 
than judicial workload concerns.     
7 Congress added 35 judgeships in 1978, 24 judgeships in 1984 and 11 
judgeships in 1990. Congress also created the Federal Circuit in 1982 with 12 
judges. U.S. Court of Appeals, Additional Judgeships Authorized by Judgeship Acts, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablec.pdf. 
8 Most significantly, Congress has expanded federal jurisdiction over time by 
creating new federal causes of action.  See, e.g., Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and 
Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 388 (2004); J. 
Harvie Wilkinson, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY 
L.J. 1147 1148-49 (1994).    Another problem has been the increased politicization 
of court appointments, which has led to many authorized judgeships sitting unfilled 
for lengthy periods of time. See David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The 
President, the Senate, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479 
(2005). See also, Carl Tobias, The Federal Appellate Courts Conundrum, 2005 
UTAH L. REV. 743 (2005).  And the courts themselves have played a role in 
increasing the scope of federal jurisdiction by recognizing new or expanded causes 
of action.  See Stern, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. at 388-89. 
9 All thirteen circuit courts have instituted alternative dispute resolution 
programs pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 33, which provides for alternative means of 
settling disputes at the appellate level with the assistance of a court appointed neutral 
party. ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (1997). The Ninth Circuit instituted its appellate mediation 
program in 1984 and in 1994 achieved a 73% disposition rate by settling 598 cases. 
Ignacio J. Ruvolo, Appellate Mediation – “Settling” The Last Frontier of ADR, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 177 (2005). 
10 The dramatic rise of unpublished opinions comes as of the result of a push in 
the 1970s to establish criteria for when opinions should remain unpublished. Michael 
Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 201 (2001). Since then unpublished 
opinions have increased from 11.5% of total opinions in 1981 to 81.6% in 2005 with 
the number increasing each year and consistently reaching over 90% in the Fourth 
Circuit. See id. at 203 and U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl. S-3 (2005), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html). See also, Posner, 
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 This article focuses on a different kind of approach used by 
appellate courts to alleviate the caseload crunch.  The body of 
procedures that govern an appeal in the federal courts is comprised of 
several sources, of which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Criminal Procedure and Appellate Procedure are only the most 
obvious and visible.  Each of those sets of rules is mandatory and 
fixed, and courts have little power to change them.12  By contrast, a 
court’s internal rules and procedures are far more malleable.  Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 permits appellate courts to introduce 
local rules and procedures, so long as they are consistent with the 
mandatory procedural rules and an opportunity for notice and 
comment is provided.13  28 U.S.C. § 2077(b) further requires each 
court of appeals to establish an advisory committee “for the study of 
the rules of practice and internal operating procedures of such 
court.”14  Notice and comment periods and advisory committees aside, 
                                                                                                                                         
supra note 2, at 162-71. However, the effectiveness of unpublished opinions as a 
time-saving measure may well be undercut by the recently adopted Fed. R. App. P. 
32.1, which allows citation to unpublished opinions as precedential authority.  Pierre 
N. Leval, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, Panel Discussion, The Appellate 
Judges Speak, 74 FORDHAM L. REV 1, 14 (2005) (arguing that permitting citation to 
unpublished opinions will require judges to spend more time on those opinions).  
11 Courts are upholding arbitration awards with narrow review to ensure that 
arbitration is an alternative step, not another layer in litigation. B.L. Harbert 
International v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006). See also, Cyctyc 
Corp. v. DEKA Products Ltd. Partnership, 439 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(emphasizing that court review of arbitral awards is narrower than review of lower 
court decisions by appellate courts). 
12 I say little power rather than no power to account for obvious caveats.  First, 
courts and judges can (and do) promote modifications to the rules, either by writing 
opinions that point out perceived weaknesses in the rules as constituted or by 
engaging in more informal advocacy such as giving speeches, writing articles, or 
placing phone calls.  This may be viewed as power to change the rules, but it is 
power of an indirect and uncertain variety.  Second, courts can control the formal 
procedural rules to the extent that their terms are open to interpretation.  But 
interpretations that deviate too far afield are likely to be noticed and policed by the 
Supreme Court.  A prominent recent example of judicial efforts along these lines 
was the attempts by lower courts – followed by rejections by the Supreme Court – to 
impose heightened pleading requirement in certain contexts.  See Leatherman v. 
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.  1163 (1993); 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
13 Fed. R. App. P. 47; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (providing statutory authority 
for courts of appeals to introduce rules and procedures). 
14 28 U.S.C. § 2077(a) adds the further requirement that a court’s rules and 
procedures be published. 
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Rule 47 clearly places the ultimate authority for rulemaking in the 
hands of the judges themselves.15   
Local rulemaking authority is not limitless by any stretch, but 
it does provide a space in which courts can act directly and with 
relative ease.  And there is some evidence that courts are maneuvering 
within that space to address caseload concerns.  This article takes a 
close look at one example of such an effort.  In 1986, the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals used its rulemaking authority to 
alter the internal procedure for announcing the composition of merits 
panels to litigants.16  Prior to that year, all federal circuits announced 
the composition of appellate panels only shortly before a scheduled 
oral argument.  Under the D.C. Circuit’s modified procedure, panel 
announcement instead comes within sixty days of filing and 
accompanies the initial scheduling of oral argument.17  As a result, 
litigants receive panel composition information up to six months in 
advance of oral argument.   
No official explanation accompanied the introduction of the 
new procedure, but at least one judge then serving on the court has 
provided an informal account.  According to Judge Harry T. Edwards, 
the primary motivation was the convenience of the parties.18  But a 
secondary motivation also existed:  
 
                                                          
15 Fed. R. App. P. 47(a)(1) (requiring only a majority vote by active regular 
service judges to promulgate local rules and procedures). 
16 The versions of Fed. R. App. P. 47 and 28 U.S.C. § 2077 applicable in 1986 
were different from the current versions, but not appreciably so.  An advisory 
committee was still required for the courts of appeals (although not for district 
courts), and  
17 “Ordinarily, the Court discloses merits panels to counsel in the order setting 
the case for oral argument.” United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures, § II.B.8(a), in 5 
FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES (West 2d ed. 1997; rev. April 1999). “[I]n civil 
cases, oral argument dates and panels are usually set before the briefs are filed.” Id. 
at § IV.A.3.  See also Patricia M. Wald, . . . Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1138 (1992) (“We took a chance on disclosing the 
identities of merits panels, as well as the dates of oral argument, within sixty days of 
filing.”).  As Judge Wald’s comment makes clear, the D.C. Circuit policy is 
applicable only in civil cases. 
18 Harry T. Edwards, Letter to Robert Brown and Allison Lee, quoted in J. 
Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Appendix: The Neutral Assignment of 
Judges at the Court of Appeals, at 
http://www.law.du.edu/courts/Jones_article_webmaterial_2000.htm (accessed 
January 24, 2006).  
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It occurred to us that this false assumption [that panel 
composition permitted prediction of the outcome] 
might lead some parties to settle their claims to avoid 
certain panels.  We were happy to accommodate those 
who might thus settle their cases and thereby reduce 
our caseload.19
 
For almost twenty years, no other circuits followed the D.C. 
Circuit’s move toward earlier announcement.  Then, in 2004, the 
Federal Circuit provisionally adopted a rule change that moved the 
announcement of panels to an earlier stage in the proceedings.  Rather 
than announce panel assignment on the morning of the argument, the 
new rule provided for that announcement one week in advance of the 
argument.20  Shortly before the actual adoption of this procedural 
change, Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge discussed it in 
hypothetical terms and concluded – echoing Judge Edwards – that 
earlier announcement “would be a simple, cost-free way for the court 
to increase the settlement rate.”21  There were early signs that the new 
procedure was indeed affecting litigant behavior.  Most notably, the 
parties informed the court during oral argument in Apotex v. Pfizer22 
that Pfizer had executed a covenant not to sue for patent infringement.  
                                                          
19 Id.  See also Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of 
Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 837, 853-54 (“[I]n the D.C. Circuit, 
the names of the judges who are assigned to hear an appeal are announced well in 
advance to encourage … settlements.  By blaming their withdrawal on the 
composition of judicial panels, rather than on the merits of their cases, lawyers are 
able to save face while simultaneously freeing the court system of unnecessary 
burdens.  If this provides a palatable excuse and thus increases settlements, then the 
false image of a politicized judiciary may have some salutary effect.”). 
20 Although this change is noteworthy for present purposes because it shifted 
panel announcement to an earlier point in the appeals process, even it does not come 
close to replicating the D.C. Circuit’s extreme policy.  Instead, the provisional rule 
brought the Federal Circuit’s policy in line with the policies of many circuits that 
announce panels shortly before the scheduled argument.  See Howard J. Bashman, 
Who’s on the Argument Panel:  Why Ignorance Isn’t Bliss, available at 
www.law.com (April 3, 2006) (describing announcement policies).   
21 R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1175 
(2004).  Unlike Judge Edwards, however, Wagner and Petherbridge ultimately 
cautioned against adoption of an early announcement procedure – despite its promise 
as a caseload-reducing tool.  For further discussion of their reasons for sounding 
cautionary notes, see infra Part III.A.    
22 125 Fed.Appx. 987 (Fed. Cir. April 11, 2005). 
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The covenant not to sue rendered the appeal moot, and the court 
promptly issued a short opinion dismissing the case for lack of 
jurisdiction.  There is good reason to believe that Pfizer’s action was 
in direct response to panel announcement.23  But rather than being 
viewed as an indication of success, at least one member of the panel 
lamented the result, remarking during argument that “maybe posting 
paneling is a very, very bad thing.”24  And it would appear that Judge 
Mayer was not alone in that sentiment; as of February 6, 2006, the 
court has reverted to its original procedure of announcing panels on 
the day of a scheduled argument.25
The recent Federal Circuit experimentation with – and 
rejection of – early announcement, along with the ever-increasing 
pressures for courts to find ways to handle cases efficiently, occasions 
a new examination of the effectiveness and effect of early 
announcement rules in particular and of local rules designed to address 
caseload concerns in general.  Part I.A begins by situating the D.C. 
Circuit procedure as a form of “cue and response.”  The belief that 
early panel announcement will generate increased settlement activity 
is based on assumptions that litigants will perceive the announcement 
as a relevant cue and that they will respond to the cue by pursuing 
settlement. The rise of theoretical and empirical accounts of the 
“attitudinal model” of judging provides support for the cuing 
assumption because it has led to a growing perception that the identity 
of the judge matters to the outcome of the case.  In the context of 
appeals, that translates to a perception that the composition of judicial 
panels matters, due either to a simple aggregation of the individual 
effects of judicial characteristics or to the combined effect of group 
characteristics.  Support for the response assumption comes from the 
conventional law and economics theory of settlement, which posits 
that settlement decisions are responsive to information regarding likely 
                                                          
23 In Apotex, the issue related to whether the filing of an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) by itself creates a reasonable apprehension of suit.  In an 
earlier case, Pfizer v. Teva, the Federal Circuit had held that it does not.  Judge 
Mayer, who dissented in Teva, was assigned to the Apotex panel, a sign that perhaps 
the Pfizer holding was insecure.  The covenant not to sue was entered into after the 
panel was announced.  Patently-O, patentlaw.typepad.com (March 14 and April 11, 
2005). 
24 Patently-O, patentlaw.typepad.com (March 14, 2005).  
25 According to Howard Bashman, the reversion to the original announcement 
procedure was also motivated by a “negative reaction to an increased amount of 
attorney pandering at oral argument.” See Bashman, supra note 20.   
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outcome and that settlement is more likely when the probable outcome 
is more certain.  If the court’s cue equates to new information that 
makes the probably outcome more certain, litigants should respond, 
and their response should lead to settlement in at least some cases.   
Despite the fairly straightforward case for a settlement effect, 
Part I.B concludes that the D.C. Circuit rule has been only weakly 
effective in those terms.  I begin by comparing rates of voluntary 
dismissal in civil non-administrative cases filed in the Second, Seventh 
and D.C. Circuits, and find no significant difference between the 
circuits.  If anything, the rate of voluntary dismissal appears lower in 
the D.C. Circuit than in the other circuits studied, even when 
controlling for subject matter and governmental involvement.  Of 
course, an inter-circuit study may mislead if other differences in 
practice or procedure contribute to general variances in the rate of 
voluntary dismissal across circuits.  To account for that possibility, I 
look instead at voluntary dismissal activity within the D.C. Circuit 
alone.  Of 63 cases in which a panel was assigned, 13 were dismissed 
voluntarily prior to oral argument.  Although there is no way to assess 
from docket sheet information whether these dismissals were directly 
responsive to panel announcement, that number provides at least weak 
support that the announcement rule affects behavior in some cases.   
Part II discusses various barriers that limit the effectiveness of 
early announcement as a settlement-promoting tool.  Some of these 
barriers stem from failures in the content of the court’s cue, while 
others owe to failures in the way litigants respond to the cue.  Content 
barriers arise when the actual panel composition information does not 
produce significant updating relative to a litigant’s pre-announcement 
outcome prediction.  This is true, for example, when the announced 
panel is ideologically close to the panel that would be expected given 
the court’s overall composition.  It is also true when litigants do not 
perceive the outcome to be affected by the particulars of panel 
composition – in other words, when litigants do not view the 
attitudinal model as operational in practice.  Response barriers arise 
when litigants do not perceive and respond to the court’s cue 
rationally.  Some litigants may simply fail to notice the cue.  More 
likely, many litigants may notice the cue but then make mistakes 
interpreting and incorporating its content.  To the extent they occur, all 
of these barriers are largely intractable.  This is because the actions 
necessary to overcome them would require the court to take an 
unacceptably active role in the dissemination and interpretation of the 
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announcement cue.  In the end, the stubbornness of these various 
barriers means that the early announcement procedure can only hope 
to have a limited effect.   
Part III explores how the barriers that limit the early 
announcement procedure’s effectiveness may also introduce 
distortions into the body of cases that ultimately proceed to oral 
argument.  As an example, consider the barrier created by the fact that 
some panels are not particularly predictable.  This barrier is also the 
source of a distortion because it means that relatively more cases 
involving predictable panels will settle, and conversely that the panels 
hearing the cases that proceed to oral argument will be relatively more 
unpredictable.  Other distortions include overrepresentation among 
oral argument cases of appeals that involve unsophisticated litigants, 
are motivated by an interest in a judgment per se, and that are 
relatively non-responsive to panel composition.  Each of these 
distortions has the potential to create serious problems in terms of the 
court’s ability to perform its adjudicative functions adequately.  Those 
serious problems arise only in the extreme case, however, and the 
extreme case is unlikely because the existence of other barriers 
contains the severity of any one distortion.  Even so, caseload 
distortions as a by-product of the early announcement procedure 
deserve careful attention.  Similar distortions are possible whenever a 
court introduces a “cue and response” procedure, and full 
consideration of the desirability of any such procedure should account 
for them. 
 
I. THE D.C. CIRCUIT PROCEDURE:  THEORY AND EFFECT 
 
Why would Judge Edwards believe that early announcement 
will increase settlement activity?  The basic theory is one of cue and 
response:  Early announcement constitutes a cue to litigants, who 
respond because they believe that the content of the cue is relevant.  In 
basic terms, early announcement is deemed a relevant cue because 
litigants are assumed to perceive a relationship between the identity of 
judges assigned to hear the appeal and the likely outcome of the 
appeal.  And litigants are expected to pursue settlement in response 
because settlement decisions are related to expectations about likely 
outcome.  If the cue and response theory holds up in practice, we 
should expect that the degree of pre-argument settlement activity will 
be higher when the cue is provided than when it is not.  In other 
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words, we might expect the rate of voluntary dismissal in the D.C. 
Circuit to be higher than in other circuits.  I find no evidence to 
support this expectation.  But that result might be misleading; other 
unmeasured forces may contribute to inter-circuit differences in 
settlement activity that mask the effect of the early announcement 
procedure.  In an attempt to better isolate the procedure’s effect, I 
conclude this section with a closer analysis of D.C. Circuit cases.  That 
analysis suggests that the procedure may be achieving its intended 
effect in some cases. 
 
A. Theory:  Panel Announcement, Informational Cues and Settlement 
 
There is a strong predisposition in the American legal system 
toward the formalist notion that judges perform their function without 
recourse to personal ideology or past experience.  That view is a 
predictable corollary of our democratic ideals of blind justice and 
equality under the law.26  So understood, the judge is “one who 
objectively and impersonally decides cases by logically deducing the 
correct resolution from a definite and consistent body of legal rules.”27   
Judges themselves have been among the most vigorous defenders of 
the formalist model.28  In a very recent example, then-Judge Roberts 
                                                          
26 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A 
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255-64 
(1997); Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law:  
Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 871 (1991) 
(“[T]here is a fundamental formalism inherent in the very idea of legal control in the 
liberal democratic state which makes formalist argument difficult to resist or easy to 
justify.”); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-75 
(1973). 
27 John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to 
Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 
DUKE L.J. 84, 87 (1995).  For a classic enunciation of the formalist approach, see 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1959) (arguing that “legal analysis . . . can and should be free from 
contaminating political or ideological elements”).   
28 The judicial defense of formalism has a distinguished pedigree.  See, e.g., 
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824) (“Courts are the mere 
instruments of the law, and can will nothing. . . . Judicial power is never exercised 
for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge.”) (Marshall, C.J.).  For a 
more recent Supreme Court articulation of formalist ideals, see Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 561-62 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Judges, if faithful to 
their oath, approach every aspect of each case with a neutral and objective 
disposition.”).  
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testified in his Supreme Court confirmation hearings that “judges wear 
black robes because it doesn’t matter who they are as individuals.  
That’s not going to shape their decisionmaking.  It’s their 
understanding of the law that will shape their decision.”29  And Judge 
Edwards has argued that “it is the law – and not the personal politics 
of individual judges – that controls judicial decision-making in most 
cases resolved by the courts of appeals.”30   
Over the past century or more, this formalist vision of judges 
has come under sustained attack by legal scholars and social 
scientists.31  Legal realists and critical legal theorists have long argued 
that, far from being impersonal, judging is an endeavor acutely 
affected by the personal ideology and experience of those holding the 
office.32  In response to the formalist model, legal realists developed 
the “indeterminacy argument,” which asserts that judicial decisions 
cannot be rationally deduced because of conflicting rules within the 
law and because of the susceptibility of those rules to conflicting 
interpretations.33  Rather than rational deduction, the legal realists 
                                                          
29  Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, J-109-
37 at 178 (2005) (testimony of Hon. John G. Roberts). Similarly, Patricia Wald has 
urged that “[t]he black robes we wear on the bench unite us in their lack of 
distinguishability; they make a simple but striking point:  We are neither Democratic 
judges nor Republican judges but, simply, United States judges.”  Patricia M. Wald, 
Colloquy:  A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 240 (1999).   
30 Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the ‘Politics’ of 
Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 
620 (1985).  See also Bartlett v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(Edwards, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (defending the “integrity 
of panel judges, who are both intelligent enough to know the law and conscientious 
enough to abide by their oath to uphold it”).   
31 For early formulations of the argument that judicial attitudes affect 
decisionmaking, see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 116 (1930); Karl 
N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 
443 (1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive:  The Function of the 
“Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 277-78 (1929).   
32 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg, & Steward J. Schwab, 
Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257 (1995)(“Since the rise of legal realism, it has been 
axiomatic that the background and worldview of judges influence cases.”). 
33 For a good discussion of the development of the indeterminacy argument, see 
Hasnas, supra note 27, at 86-98.  Critical Legal Theorists revived the realist 
indeterminacy argument in the 1980s.  For an example of such a revival, see Gary 
Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1152, 1152-53 
(1985)(arguing that application of legal rules is necessarily informed by both policy 
considerations and political considerations). 
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contend that legal decisions are the result of judicial choices regarding 
which rules to apply and how to apply them.  Those choices are in turn 
determined by value judgments and judicial beliefs about the propriety 
of certain outcomes.34  
Social science studies developing an “attitudinal model” of 
judicial behavior lend general credence to the realist view.35  These 
studies attempt to establish links between various judicial 
characteristics and voting outcomes.  The link most often studied is 
that between voting behavior and ideology. Studies of this sort 
typically measure ideology by reference to the party affiliation of the 
nominating President,36 although studies using other ideological 
indicators also exist.37  In addition to ideology, studies have analyzed 
correlations between voting behavior and various other judicial 
                                                          
34 See, e.g., Posner,  supra note 5 (articulating a similar realist explanation of the 
Court). 
35 See generally, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).  The “attitudinal model” moniker is not 
universally accepted, but it is prevalent and will be used throughout this article for 
the sake of simplicity and clarity.  See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES 
POLITICAL? (2006). 
36 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the 
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1770-71 (1997) (discussing the District of 
Columbia Circuit in particular); Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of Appeals, in 
THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 35, 42-43 (John B. Gates & 
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party 
and Region on Voting Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1955-1986, 
43 W. POL. Q. 317, 322-23 (1990); Richard J. Pierce, Two Problems in 
Administrative Law:  Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and 
Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303-07 (discussing 
the District of Columbia Circuit in particular); Jon Gottschall, Reagan’s 
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial 
Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48, 51-54 (1986); ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, 
POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 51-83 (1983); C. 
Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362-63 (1981); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 374, 376-83 (1966); Stuart S. 
Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 
843, 845 (1961).     
37 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 818 (1995)(using newspapers 
editorials to establish ideological values).  Indeed, even Judge Wald has conceded 
that “subtly or unconsciously, the judge’s political orientation will affect 
decisionmaking.”  Patricia M. Wald, quoted in LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN 
COURTS 13 (3d ed. 1994). 
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characteristics, including geography,38 age,39 gender,40 religion,41 
tenure,42 and past experience.43  Most – although certainly not all – of 
these studies claim to find positive correlations between judicial 
characteristics and voting patterns.  And although the methodology 
employed has been the source of some debate,44 their cumulative 
effect – together with the theoretical work of the legal realists and their 
successors – has been to solidify the notion that judicial characteristics 
matter to legal outcomes.  In short, even if not accurate, the attitudinal 
model of judging has become prevalent, and prevalence is good 
enough to support the claim that litigants might view the identity of 
the judge as a relevant factor in the prediction of a case’s outcome.45
                                                          
38 See, e.g., Songer & Davis, supra note 36. 
39 See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, The Effect of Past Judicial Behavior on 
Subsequent Decision-Making, 19 JURIMETRICS J. 208, 212 (1979)(finding age a 
relatively important factor for Civil Liberties voting).   
40 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter:  Gender and 
Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L. J. 1759 
(2005); G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: 
Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985)(female judges tend to be 
less supportive of personal rights claims and minority policy positions than male 
judges, and tend to demonstrate greater deference to positions taken by the 
government); but see Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the 
Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition, 14 SOC. SCI. 
J. 77, 86 (1977)(female judges behave no differently than their male colleagues in 
sentencing criminal defendants). 
41 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 39; Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds 
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966).   
42 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent:  
Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1190 (1991); 
Goldman, supra note 39.  
43 See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 42 (finding a correlation between voting 
in racial equal protection cases and prior prosecutorial experience); Goldman, supra 
note 39. 
44 Compare Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 (2002) with Frank Cross, Michael Heise & Gregory Sisk, Above the Rules: A 
Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135 (2002) and Jack Goldsmith & 
Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 153 (2002). See also H.W. Perry, Taking Political Science Seriously, 47 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 889, 891 (2003) (claiming that most political scientists would not 
believe that attitudes are the sole determinant, or that they play as singular a role as 
propounded by the so-called "attitudinal model").    
45 Of particular relevance here is the explicit connection some have made 
between the attitudinal model and effective lawyering:  Because judicial 
characteristics affect outcomes, those characteristics (and other external factors that 
might influence decisions) should be accounted for and integrated into the lawyer’s 
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If lawyers believe that judicial characteristics affect the 
decisions of individual judges, then it is no great stretch to conclude 
that they might also believe that the combined characteristics of a 
panel of judges will affect collective judicial decisions.  That 
conclusion follows a simple application of the attitudinal model to 
three-judge panels, and it has led some to criticize the current practice 
of randomly assigning judges to appellate panels.46  More generally, it 
                                                                                                                                         
decisionmaking process.  So, for example, Hasnas has urged that lawyers “would be 
better able to predict the outcome of cases and correctly advise their clients if they 
studied the social factors that influence[] judges’ behavior.” Hasnas, supra note 27, 
at 89; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and 
Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 581 (1993)(“Not surprisingly, according to the 
realist, the ideal lawyer is the one who is in the best position to counsel his clients 
about what to expect from litigation. That lawyer will need to know what leads 
judges to decide as they do, not what legal reasons, if any, would justify their 
decisions.... The best explanation of judicial decisions may include the set of binding 
legal reasons, but cannot be limited to them. Instead, explanations will point to 
psychological and sociological facts about judges as part, if not all, of the causal 
story.”).   
46 Although not required by statute, every circuit of the United States Court of 
Appeals now uses some form of random assignment to compose the three-judge 
panels who hear and decide cases.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, 
Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 630 
(1994)(describing random assignment as a central characteristic of federal judicial 
procedure).  For a description of the specific assignment procedures used by the 
various circuits, see J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Appendix: The 
Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, at 
http://www.law.du.edu/courts/Jones_article_webmaterial_2000.htm (accessed May 
15, 2006). 
 Random assignment arguably contains an implicit endorsement of judicial 
formalism because it assumes that “all judges act with reasonably equivalent 
motives,” such that random assignment is neutral with respect to case outcomes.  
Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, Colloquy: A Modest Proposal for Improving 
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 217 (1999).  But if the attitudinal model 
is correct, then random assignment will not necessarily guarantee neutrality and a 
non-random assignment procedure might be required to achieve neutral panels.  For 
further discussion of proposals for introducing neutral but non-random assignment 
procedures, see infra note 117. 
Two additional points related to random assignment and neutrality merit brief 
mention.  First, the practice of random assignment might be defended on grounds 
other than neutrality.  That is, it may be that courts fully realize that panel 
composition will affect case outcomes, but that they nevertheless feel that random 
assignment is the best way to deal with that fact.  However, given the strong defense 
of judicial formalism by most judges, it is reasonable to conclude that random 
assignment would be defended instead on neutrality grounds. For an enunciation of 
the contrary interpretation, see J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 Early Panel Announcement 15 
has generated concern about the influence of panel composition on 
case outcomes.  As expressed by Michael Hasday, “[w]inning a case 
in the U.S. courts of appeals hinges too much on luck, and not enough 
on the merits.  The system produces slot machine justice, in which the 
outcome crucially turns on the three judges selected to hear the 
case.”47  Given the numerous attitudinal studies, and the clear logical 
connection between those studies and the conclusion that the 
composition of panels is an important determinant of case outcomes, 
the prevalence of this concern is hardly surprising. 
  Recently a second argument has been developed that provides 
additional support for the notion that panel composition affects case 
outcomes.  Building on insights from the psychology of group 
decision-making, Richard Revesz, Cass Sunstein and others have 
argued that the interplay of characteristics among the three judges on a 
panel affect voting patterns in ways that are different than a simple 
aggregation of individual characteristics might suggest.48  For 
example, both Sunstein and Revesz have concluded that, at least in 
certain contexts, the ideology of other judges on a panel is as good or 
better a predictor of a judge’s vote than his or her own ideology.49  
                                                                                                                                         
Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1066-69 
(2000)(arguing that “the system can do no more than ensure that, whatever biases 
judges bring to the decisionmaking process, they play no role in the assignment 
process”).  Second, formalistic ideals are by no means the only rationale for random 
assignment.  To the contrary, random assignment also serves to “prevent[] judge 
shopping by any party, thereby enhancing public confidence in the assignment 
process,” and to “ensure[] an equitable distribution of the case load” among judges 
of a court.  United States v. Mavroules, 798 F.Supp. 61, 61 (D.Mass. 1992). 
47 Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 291 (2000).  Similarly, Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross have argued 
that partisan imbalances in panel composition “often lead to case outcomes that 
reflect partisan interests.” Emerson H. Tiller and Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal 
for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215. 
48 Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological 
Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 
301, 337-46 (2004); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and 
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 
YALE L.J. 2155, 2168-72 (1998); Revesz, supra note 36. 
49  Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 317; Revesz, supra note 36, at 319 (looking 
specifically at environmental regulation cases in the District of Columbia Circuit, 
and noting that “the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel has a greater 
bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation”).  See also, Thomas J. 
Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy, (forthcoming 2006) 
(draft available at 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/rpp/Sunstein%20Realism%20Chevron.pdf). 
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And both have concluded that ideologically uniform panels behave 
differently than those that are ideologically diverse.50  There is more 
to be said about these studies,51 but for present purposes it is enough 
to note that arguments concerning “panel dynamics” reinforce the 
basic notion that predictions as to outcome can be meaningfully 
updated and improved if the identity of judges assigned to reach the 
outcome is known in advance.   
It remains to establish a connection between predictive updates 
regarding  likely outcome and a litigant’s subsequent decision to 
continue the appeal or to pursue voluntarily dismissal, either through 
settlement or – in the case of an appellant – through a unilateral 
motion to dismiss.  This connection is a natural extension of the well-
accepted proposition that decisions regarding litigation and settlement 
are affected to a great extent by expectations about outcome.  More 
than twenty years ago, George Priest and Benjamin Klein argued that 
the “the determinants of settlement and litigation are solely economic, 
including the expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse 
decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of 
success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement.”52  
Relevant considerations that inform the likelihood of success at trial 
should include the “predilections of a judge” as well as the 
“application of a legal rule.”53
Those basic conclusions also apply at the appellate level.  In 
most cases, the economic calculus of the parties should primarily 
                                                          
50 Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 343; Tiller & Cross, supra note 47, at 220-
221. See also Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partisanship, supra note 48, at 2169-74.      
51 See infra notes 108-121 and accompanying text for a further discussion of 
panel dynamics. 
52 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984).  Further studies have softened – or at least clarified – 
the strong Priest-Klein assertion in certain limited cases where at least one of the 
parties is motivated by an interested in a judgment per se.  See generally Steven 
Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 434 (2004).  In such cases, 
settlement may not result even if both parties understand that the plaintiff is very 
likely to win.  This possibility highlights the fact that “the information that parties 
possess about the likelihood of success at trial” is not the only relevant factor to 
litigants, and that the “expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions” 
may dominate in some instances.  And they explain why I have hedged a bit by 
saying that “decisions regarding litigation and settlement are affected to a great 
extent by expectations about outcome.”  For a discussion of how an interest in a 
judgment per se might limit the effectiveness of early panel announcement, see notes 
82 and accompanying text. 
53 Priest & Klein, supra note 52, at 35. 
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determine whether an appeal is filed in the first instance.54  But if 
relevant information regarding the likelihood of success (or any other 
economic factor related to the likely costs or benefits of the appeal) is 
introduced only after the inception of the appeal, then the economic 
calculus will shift and future decisions related to the ongoing appeal 
may be affected.  For example, suppose that a decision is made to file 
an appeal in a particular case, and that the Supreme Court 
subsequently issues an opinion that clarifies one of the issues at stake. 
In that circumstance, the parties should be expected to update their 
predictions regarding the application of legal rules, and new decisions 
to settle or dismiss may result.  Because it is perceived to bear a 
relation to the likely outcome of the appeal, the introduction of panel 
composition information at some point in the appeals process operates 
in similar fashion.  Once that information is announced, predictions 
regarding outcome should be updated, and decisions regarding the 
desirability of settlement may be altered.55  
 In sum, the theory of a settlement effect created by early panel 
announcement relies is one of cue and response.  Announcing panel 
composition at a relatively early stage provides an informational cue 
that litigants will view as relevant to the likely outcome of the appeal.  
Rational litigants will respond to that cue by updating their 
expectations, which may lead to settlement or voluntary dismissal if 
the updated expectations create a zone for mutual agreement and if the 
cost of pursuing that agreement is less than the additional costs 
necessary to pursue the appeal to completion.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 In fact, according to much of the theoretical literature on the Priest-Klein 
hypothesis, decisions to settle after an appeal has been filed are anomalous and occur 
only in instances of informational asymmetry. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A 
New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 14 (1996).  
55 For more on the formal economic models underlying settlement decisions in 
response to new information introduced during the appeals process, see generally 
Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts:  
Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts, 24 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 685 (2000); more generally, see Joseph Grundfest and Peter Huang, The 
Unexpected Value of Litigation:  A Real Options Perspective, 58 STANFORD L. REV.  
___ (forthcoming 2006).    
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B. Effect:  
Intercircuit Comparison and Intracircuit Analysis 
 
Is the D.C. Circuit’s early announcement rule producing its 
intended effect?   I approach this question from two directions.  First, I 
look at the rate of voluntary dismissal in the D.C. Circuit relative to 
other circuits.  I find that the D.C. Circuit does not have a higher rate 
of voluntary dismissal, and that this is true even when accounting for 
differences in subject matter and government involvement in the 
appeal.  This finding is suggestive, but certainly not determinative.  If 
other unmeasured factors contribute to general differences in the rates 
of voluntary dismissal across circuits, then the apparent lack of an 
announcement effect could be misleading.56  To account for that 
possibility, I take a close look at the effect of the panel announcement 
procedure in the D.C. Circuit and conclude that the procedure appears 
to be at least weakly effective in terms of promoting settlement 
activity.  
  
1. Intercircuit Comparison of Voluntary Dismissal Activity 
 
The data set for this comparison consists of 600 appeals filed 
in the Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits beginning 
on March 1, 2000.  Those circuits were selected because they 
exemplify the panel announcement variations that are typical across 
circuits. Regardless of the internal procedures used for panel 
composition and case assignment, most circuits do not announce panel 
composition to litigants until shortly before the oral argument is 
scheduled. The policy of the Second Circuit is representative in this 
regard, with panel assignments announced on the Thursday before the 
argument.57  The Seventh Circuit is the most extreme, releasing the 
panel information only on the morning of the argument.58 In both 
circuits, the identity of the panel is not known until after all briefs are 
filed.  
                                                          
56 Another way to get a suggestive finding would be to compare voluntary 
dismissal rates within the D.C. Circuit before and after adoption of the rule.  This 
approach has the benefit of eliminating the potential for inter-circuit differences in 
the underlying rates of voluntary dismissal, but it runs the risk of simply substituting 
inter-temporal differences. 
57 Revesz, supra note 55, at 688.  
58 Id. 
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The start date was selected basically at random, although an 
effort was made to choose a date sufficiently early that all appeals 
considered in the study had reached a final disposition.  For each 
circuit, the data consist of the first 200 qualifying appeals filed on or 
after the start date.59  A qualifying appeal is defined for these purposes 
as a civil,60 non-administrative case that is appealed from a federal 
district court61 and that does not involve a prisoner.62  In addition, 
appeals that were consolidated with other appeals already in the data 
set were not separately considered.63
                                                          
59 This meant that the last appeal considered in the study was filed on:  April 14, 
2000 in the Second Circuit, April 26, 2000 in the Seventh Circuit, and June 29, 2001 
in the District of Columbia Circuit. 
60 Criminal appeals are not included primarily because the D.C. Circuit’s early 
announcement procedure does not apply to those appeals.  See Handbook of 
Practice, supra note 17, at § II.B.8(a) (“[I]n criminal appeals, unlike most civil 
appeals, the panel will not be disclosed until after the parties have filed briefs.”).  
But the exclusion of criminal cases is sensible for other reasons as well.  The 
traditional settlement calculus, discussed infra Part I.A, does not cleanly apply to 
criminal appeals because those cases are not characterized by symmetrical stakes, 
cost savings from settlement, and error characteristics.  See Kate Stith, The Risk of 
Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right 
to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 n. 49 (1990).  Exclusion of criminal appeals 
should not inhibit the ability of the study to test for an early announcement effect; if 
anything, study of civil appeals alone should overestimate the overall effect of an 
early announcement procedure on caseload reduction. 
61 That is, appeals from bankruptcy and tax courts, as well as those from 
administrative agency adjudications, are not considered. Unsurprisingly, this led to 
the highest percentage of excluded cases in the D.C. Circuit.  These cases were 
excluded in an effort to maintain some degree of consistency in the cases, such that 
reliable comparisons across circuits could be made.  Since most of the literature 
concerning the Priest-Klein hypothesis centers around its effect on civil actions, the 
analysis in this article is confined to civil appeals. 
62 Prisoners generally proceed informa pauperis and their appeals – most often 
in the form of habeas corpus or mandamus claims – are not susceptible to settlement 
in the same way as private civil appeals.  In addition, the economic calculus that 
underlies the Priest-Klein hypothesis does not apply to prisoner appeals.  Because 
the stakes of the appeal are very high and the costs are very low, prisoners are not 
likely to be responsive to changes in information regarding probable outcomes.  For 
further discussion, see generally Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial 
Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989).  As with 
the exclusion of criminal appeals, see supra note 60, the exclusion of prisoner 
appeals should lead, if anything, to an overestimation of the overall settlement effect 
of an early announcement procedure.    
63 Cross-appeals that led to a different disposition from the original appeal were 
included, however. 
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Information from the court docket sheets was used to code the 
data.64  Although the docket sheet does not contain any categorization 
relating to disposition, it does include the relevant information 
necessary to create such a categorization.  Therefore, I coded the 
disposition of each appeal using the following categorization:  Oral 
Argument (OA), Merits Decision Without Oral Argument (DWOA), 
Dismissal by Court (D/C), and Dismissal by Parties (D/P).  Table 1 
shows the basic results.65
 
 
 
                                                          
64 Docket sheets are available through the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts’ PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) system, accessible 
online at www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov.  Of course, political scientists prefer the use 
of standardized data sets rather than individually coded data, and have criticized 
legal empirical research on that basis.  See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Political 
(Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 783, 807-09 (2003).  Although 
generally sympathetic to this concern, I am aware of no standardized data source that 
includes data of the sort used here. 
65 One noteworthy finding from Table 1 – the disproportionately high 
percentage of OA cases in the Second Circuit – merits a brief explanation.  With few 
exceptions, the Second Circuit hears oral argument in every case that proceeds to the 
merits stage, and so the DWOA category is essentially a null category in that 
circuit.This is an obvious example of how local court practice and procedure can 
affect the way that appeals progress.  In this case, the Second Circuit’s strong 
preference for oral argument means that many appeals proceed to oral argument that 
would be decided in other circuits without one.  The Second Circuit might justify its 
preference in two ways.  First, the court may view universal oral argument as a 
decision-enhancing mechanism.  Even in cases that appear straightforward on the 
briefs, oral argument may alter the way the panel views the case.  In some small 
body of cases, it may even result in a change in the direction or the terms of the 
court’s ultimate decision.  Alternatively, the court may view universal oral argument 
as a perception-enhancing mechanism.  That is, even if the court feels that the oral 
argument provides no actual benefit in terms of the decisions it reaches, it may prefer 
them even so because it is a low-cost way to attain a valuable benefit in the form of 
an improved perception of fairness by litigants.  This would be true if litigants view 
oral argument as an important symbol that the court is taking its case seriously and 
considering it carefully.  In either case, the rule is in place precisely because the 
court expects that it will have some effect on outcome or perception of outcome.   
There is a final possibility that is independent of any such anticipated effect.  The 
court may think that the time and resources necessary to identify cases that would be 
candidates for decisions without oral argument exceeds the savings in time and 
resources that are gained by deciding them in that manner.  Given the relative ease of 
issuing an order to dispose of a case without oral argument, however, this 
explanation seems quite unlikely. 
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Table 1:  Disposition of 
Appeals, by Circuit 
Second 
Circuit 
Seventh 
Circuit 
D.C. 
Circuit 
Oral Argument 100 (50.0%) 
66 
(33.0%) 
50 
(25.0%) 
Merits Decision without 
Oral Argument 
4 
(2.0%) 
31 
(15.5%) 
69 
(34.5%) 
Dismissal by Court 36 (18.0%) 
41 
(20.5%) 
40 
(20.0%) 
Dismissal by Parties 60 (30.0%) 
62 
(31.0%) 
41 
(20.5%) 
Total 200 (100.0%) 
200 
(100.0%)
200 
(100.0%) 
 
A logical analytical starting point is a consideration of the 
overall rates of voluntary dismissal for each circuit.   The D.C. Circuit 
had a significantly lower number of cases dismissed by parties than 
either of the other two circuits.66  This is unexpected given the theory 
that early announcement will encourage parties to settle and therefore 
voluntarily dismiss cases.  In very basic terms, then, there is no 
support for the notion that the cue and response mechanism is 
generating its intended effect. 
But of course other characteristics of the cases included in the 
data set may be contributing to differences in the rates of voluntary 
dismissal.  In an attempt to account for such characteristics, I coded 
two additional variables for each case:  subject matter and the 
involvement of a governmental entity.  The docket sheet includes a 
categorization of the appeal by subject matter, which I used to create 
the following general categories of appeals:  Employment and Labor 
(EL), Other Civil Rights (OCR),67 Personal Injury (PI), Other 
                                                          
66 A comparison of the sample frequency of voluntary dismissals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit and the Second Circuit produced a one-sided t-value of 2.2 and 
a corresponding p-value of .01.  A similar comparison between the District of 
Columbia and Seventh Circuit frequencies produced a one-sided t-value of 2.4 and a 
p-value of .01. 
67 This does not include civil rights-based employment claims, which are 
included instead in the EL category. 
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Statutory Actions (OS), Contract (CN), and All Other Appeals (O).68  
Involvement of a governmental party is not generally noted explicitly 
on the docket sheet.69  Rather, I coded the data by reviewing the listed 
parties. The inclusion of any governmental entity on either side of the 
appeal was sufficient to warrant affirmative coding on the 
“Government” variable.70   
Subject matter might skew the overall data if the allocation of 
cases by subject matter varies across circuits and if the underlying rate 
                                                          
68 “All Other Cases” includes:  Securities, Real Property, Intellectual Property, 
Antitrust, Environmental, and those characterized by the court as “Other.”  The 
following table shows the subject matter distribution of cases for each circuit. 
 Second 
Circuit 
Seventh 
Circuit 
D.C.  
Circuit 
Employment & 
Labor 
54 
(27.0%) 
73 
(36.5%) 
51 
(25.5%) 
Other Civil 
Rights 
56 
(28.0%) 
47 
(23.5%) 
39 
(19.5%) 
Contract 30 (15.0%) 
20 
(10.0%) 
15 
(7.5%) 
Personal Injury 18 (9.0%) 
17 
(8.5%) 
14 
(7.0%) 
Other Statutory 17 (8.5%) 
18 
(9.0%) 
63 
(31.5%) 
All Other 25 (12.5%) 
25 
(12.5%) 
18 
(9.0%) 
Total 200 (100.0%) 
200 
(100.0%) 
200 
(100.0%) 
 
69 The exception to that is the D.C. Circuit practice of giving cases involving the 
United States government a docket number series that is distinct (XX-5000) from 
other civil appeals (XX-7000).  So involvement of the federal government as a party 
is explicitly categorized by the court, but involvement of other governmental entities 
must still be manually extracted from the XX-7000 appeals.  
70 That is, suits involving the United States Government as well as the Chicago 
Police Department are included as “Government” cases.  The following table shows 
the distribution of the government involvement variable for each circuit.  
 Second 
Circuit 
Seventh 
Circuit D.C. Circuit 
Government Party 55 (27.5%) 
73 
(36.5%) 
133 
(66.5%) 
No Government Party 145 (72.5%) 
127 
(63.5%) 
67 
(33.5%) 
All Cases 200 (100.0%) 
200 
(100.0%) 
200 
(100.0%) 
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of voluntary dismissal varies across subject matter categories.  This 
latter requirement seems plausible.  For example, appeals involving 
contracts might lead to a higher rate of voluntary dismissal than those 
involving civil rights.71  Similarly, government party involvement may 
skew the data if there are variations in that involvement across circuits 
and if underlying voluntary dismissal rates vary according to 
involvement.   Again, it seems at least plausible that settlement may be 
more or less likely based on whether a government party is involved.72
But the voluntary dismissal rate in the D.C. Circuit is not 
significantly higher even when accounting for these variables.  To get 
at this, I ran a binomial logistic regression on the 600 cases in the data 
set, using voluntary dismissal as the dependent variable and case 
location, subject matter and government involvement as independent 
variables.  The D.C. Circuit was the default location and All Other 
Cases was the default subject matter.  The regression results are shown 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Binomial Logistic Regression Results 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 30.690 8 .000
  Block 30.690 8 .000
  Model 30.690 8 .000
 
                                                          
71 Individuals asserting civil rights claims are often seeking to have a dignitary 
harm formally recognized, and may thus be more resistant to a monetary settlement.  
Individuals suing based on contract claims are seeking financial redress, and 
settlement may thus be more agreeable.  But the direction of the effect is 
unimportant to the point being made here, which is that a subject matter effect in any 
direction may skew the results based on all data, given the variations in subject 
matter distribution across circuits.  
72 As an intuitive matter, the presence of a governmental entity should make 
settlement less likely because the governmental entity is more likely to be a repeat 
player interested in the rule value of having a judicial decision on the books to guide 
its future behavior.  But the intuition could go the other way.  If the governmental 
entity is more concerned about the reputational or publicity effects of an adverse 
judgment, it may be more willing to settle. As in the case of subject matter effects, 
however, the directionality is not the primary concern here.  Rather, the existence of 
an effect in either direction suggests that the presence of a government party is a 
variable that should be controlled in order to get a full understanding of the data. 
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Variables in the Equation 
 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1 Seventh .543 .254 4.553 1 .033 1.721 
  Second .452 .262 2.982 1 .084 1.571 
  Government -.561 .229 5.999 1 .014 .570 
  EL -.416 .309 1.810 1 .179 .660 
  OCR -.770 .346 4.956 1 .026 .463 
  CN -.107 .373 .083 1 .774 .898 
  PI .016 .400 .002 1 .968 1.016 
  OS .214 .350 .375 1 .540 1.239 
  Constant -.871 .340 6.558 1 .010 .419 
 
 These results indicate no support for the proposition that the 
D.C. Circuit has higher rates of voluntary dismissal than either the 
Second or the Seventh.  Were that proposition true, the coefficients for 
the Seventh and Second variable should be negative.  But the results 
are just the opposite – both coefficients are positive, and at least in the 
case of the Seventh Circuit, the finding is statistically significant.  
  
2. A Closer Look at the D.C. Circuit 
 
A simple comparison of voluntary dismissal rates across three 
circuits fails to show that the D.C. Circuit is generating higher rates of 
voluntary dismissal.  But some other reason may explain why 
voluntary dismissal rates are naturally lower in the D.C. Circuit 
relative to the Second and Seventh.  Perhaps the D.C. Circuit has 
historically had a much lower rate of voluntary settlement, and the rule 
has had the effect of closing the gap.  Were that the case, then the 
comparison of rates across circuits during a single time period may not 
capture the effect of the rule.  To account for that possibility, this 
section looks at the D.C. Circuit data in isolation.73  Of 200 cases 
filed, 41 were voluntarily dismissed by parties – a rate of 20.5%.  If all 
of those voluntary dismissals were attributable to the early 
announcement rule, then the impact in terms of caseload reduction 
would fairly be considered significant.  That kind of attribution is 
surely problematic, however; it simply cannot be the case that all 
                                                          
73 A different methodological approach that would address this possibility is a  
differences-in-differences analysis.   But such an analysis is complicated here by the 
difficulty of compiling the initial time period data.   
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dismissals are generated by the rule.  Indeed, the pool of cases for 
which that explanation is even plausible is substantially smaller.  To 
state the obvious, early panel announcement is a plausible explanation 
for voluntary dismissal only when an announcement has actually been 
made prior to dismissal.  Of the 41 voluntarily dismissed cases, only 
13 satisfy that condition.  Relative to the total number of filings, the 
rate shrinks from 20.5% to 6.5% when the numerator is adjusted to 
account for this timing condition. 
 But there might be a denominator problem as well.  If the goal 
is to assess the extent to which an announcement rule influences 
litigants, it does not make sense to include other cases where no panel 
has been announced.  Instead, the denominator should consist only of 
cases where the composition of the panel has been revealed to the 
parties.  Thus, all cases involving an oral argument should be included 
along with the 13 cases voluntarily dismissed after a panel 
announcement.  Beyond that, some but not all of the cases that are 
decided without oral argument could be included.  Appeals decided 
without oral argument take one of two forms.  In some cases, the court 
grants a motion for summary affirmance; this is done by a panel, but 
there is no advance announcement of the composition of that panel 
prior to the issuance of the court order.  Alternatively, the court may 
notify the parties that no oral argument is necessary to decide the case.  
In that situation, the panel is revealed to the parties at the same time 
that the order to decide the case without oral argument is issued.   
Cases of the latter sort meet the announcement condition, but I have 
excluded them for several reasons.  To begin, the early announcement 
procedure is not technically involved in those cases because the panel 
is not revealed in association with an oral argument scheduling order.  
More importantly, the panel composition is disclosed at the same time 
that another, more powerful informational cue is revealed.  The fact 
that the court plans to decide the case without oral argument is a 
strong indication that a judgment affirming the lower court’s decision 
is forthcoming.  To the extent that any dismissal activity is generated 
by a “no oral argument” order, it is likely to be the result of the 
substance of the order itself rather than the names of the judges who 
issue it.74
                                                          
74 But it is hardly surprising that very little dismissal activity actually occurs.  
Because the overwhelmingly typical action after a “no oral argument” order is a 
judgment without memo affirming the lower court opinion, the direction and the 
terms of the court’s forthcoming decision are essentially known.  As a result, the 
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If the analysis is narrowed to the cases voluntarily dismissed 
after an oral argument order relative to the total number of cases in 
which an oral argument order was issued, what remains are 13 cases 
potentially affected by the rule out of 63 cases involving a panel 
announcement.  That represents a maximum rate of 20.6% of 
announced cases dismissed in response to the rule.  To be sure, it is 
almost certainly the case that the actual rate is somewhat lower than 
this maximum because some cases that settle after panel 
announcement may do so for an unrelated reason.  There is no way to 
disaggregate these cases from those dismissed in direct response to the 
panel information.  Still, the existence of this pool of 13 cases provides 
some tentative support for the notion that some litigants respond to the 
early announcement rule and that some settlement activity results.    
 
II. BARRIERS TO EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Despite the presence of a pool of dismissed cases for which early 
panel announcement might provide a plausible explanation, the 
general impact of the D.C. Circuit’s procedure does not appear 
overwhelming.  This Part explores two broad explanations for why 
this might be so.  The first is cuing failure, which occurs when the 
informational cue being provided may not actually be valuable to 
litigants in the way that the court expects.  The second is response 
failure, which results when litigants either ignore or misinterpret panel 
announcement information.  Modifications to the announcement 
procedure that account for these failures should enhance the settlement 
effect.  But because the court will almost certainly view effective 
modifications as unpalatable, information and litigant failures create 
intractable barriers to effectiveness in many cases.   
 
A. Cuing Failure  
 
The D.C. Circuit’s early announcement procedure will generate 
new settlement behavior only if it provides an effective informational 
                                                                                                                                         
party standing to benefit from the pending judgment would only accept a settlement 
on the same terms as the lower court opinion.  Both parties might pursue such an 
approach were there savings to be recouped that would outweigh the costs of 
negotiating the settlement.  But of course, at the point that a “no oral argument” 
order is issued, there are basically no litigation costs to be saved by dismissing the 
case because all briefs have been filed, and no additional resources need be devoted 
to preparation for oral argument. 
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cue.  Effective in this context means three things.  First, the 
information contained in the cue must be strong in the sense that it 
permits significant updating of expectations regarding likely outcome.  
Second, the information contained in the cue must be relevant to the 
litigants’ settlement calculations.  Third, the information must be 
released early enough to provide an opportunity for cost savings.  If 
any of those conditions does not hold in a given case, then the 
information being conveyed will not trigger a response from litigants.  
This section discusses situations in which panel announcement 
represents an ineffective cue and concludes that few procedural 
modifications are available to improve the cue’s effectiveness.  
 
1. Ineffectiveness due to lack of strength 
 
Absent specific panel composition information, litigants should 
form a generalized assessment of their prospects based on the overall 
composition of the court hearing the appeal.  This initial prediction can 
be expressed as an expected success calculation of qR*pR + (1-qR)pD, 
where qR is the probability of receiving a majority-Republican panel, 
and where pR and pD are the anticipated probabilities of success under 
majority-Republican and majority-Democratic panels, respectively.75  
After the court announces panel composition, the expected success 
calculation collapses to either pR or pD.  The amount of updating that 
panel announcement permits is thus determined by the gap between 
qR*pR + (1-qR)pD and pR or pD.  Where that gap is small, panel 
announcement represents an informational cue with weak content. 
Panel composition will often be a weak cue when one 
ideological group dominates the court’s overall composition.  In this 
situation, a litigant’s pre-announcement assessment will be based on 
an expectation that the panel will be comprised of a majority from the 
dominating party.  In most cases, announcement of the actual panel 
composition will simply confirm that prediction and will not provide 
enough additional information to significantly alter expectations.  For 
example, imagine a court dominated by Republican judges, such that 
qR is very high.  A litigant’s pre-announcement expectation in this case 
closely resembles pR, and the disclosure of a Republican panel triggers 
only a slight modification in expected success.  Put differently, panel 
composition information leads to greater updating when the expected 
panel based on overall court composition is relatively uncertain.  As 
                                                          
75 See Revesz, supra note 55, at 692. 
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the level of certainty increases, the value added by announcing panel 
composition decreases. 
As a practical matter, there is not much reason to believe that 
informational failure of this sort played a significant role in the D.C. 
Circuit, at least not during the time period covered by the data. During 
that time, the D.C. Circuit was composed of six active judges 
appointed by Republican presidents and four active judges appointed 
by Democratic presidents. Given that distribution, the probability of 
getting a majority-Republican panel – that is, qR – was .67.76  
Introduction of accurate panel composition information in that 
situation should lead to significant updating with respect to predicted 
outcomes that would be useful to litigants.77  In any event, the court is 
not in a position to combat this particular form of informational 
weakness because it can not easily alter its ideological composition.78
 Two other forms of informational weakness are more plausible 
in the context of the D.C. Circuit.  First, panel announcement 
represents a weak informational cue when the panel itself is not 
particularly predictable.  Early announcement is valuable because it 
clarifies the likely outcome.  But certain panels are likely to be quite 
unpredictable, and in those cases the clarification provided by panel 
announcement is minimal.  Second, panel announcement conveys 
weak information when litigants do not perceive the outcome of their 
appeal to be particularly sensitive to panel composition.  These are 
cases in which pR and pD are very similar, meaning that the bold 
                                                          
76 If nR is the number of Republican judges in a ten judge pool, then the 
probability of receiving a majority-Republican panel is given by nR(nR-1)(14- 
nR)/360. Admittedly, this number is not entirely accurate, because senior judges are 
part of the assignment pool as well, although they sit with less frequency than active 
judges.   
77 The expected outcome would shift from the pre-announcement expected 
success calculation, qR*pR + (1-qR)pD, to either pR or pD, depending on the panel 
announced.  Since qR is only .67 here, this shift should be significant in cases where 
pR and pD are not very close.  And where pR and pD are very close, panel 
announcement is unlikely to generate much settlement activity for reasons described 
later in this section. 
78 Of course, judges can contribute to a change in the overall composition of the 
court by retiring or by taking senior status, either of which would permit the 
nomination of a new judge.  But this is obviously a limited and blunt instrument for 
changing the court’s ideological composition.  Judges might also change their own 
ideology to create greater ideological diversity.  Although ideological shifts are not 
unprecedented, it seems far-fetched indeed to imagine that a judge would 
consciously choose this course in order to improve the effectiveness of early panel 
announcement.   
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predictions of the attitudinal model are not borne out in the actual 
expectations of litigants.  The pool of such cases might be sizable.  An 
overwhelming percentage of appellate decisions are unanimous, which 
seems to imply that composition does not matter all that much in the 
run of cases.79  If litigants understand the prevalence of unanimity, 
their expectations regarding outcome may not be responsive to panel 
composition.80  If the appellee and appellant expect outcomes that are 
significantly different, then appeals may still be filed.  But the addition 
of panel announcement information will result in minimal updating.   
If these forms of informational weakness are widespread, the 
court might strengthen its cue by encouraging a greater variance 
between pre- and post-announcement predictions.  Producing 
decisions that are more predictable and less unanimous should achieve 
this goal.  But aside from the possibility of disingenuousness, this 
approach imposes a cost on judges, who would have to write more 
dissents.  The court’s goal of managing judicial workload would thus 
be undermined.  Another alternative is to convince litigants through 
less costly means that panel composition actually matters in most 
cases.  But for reasons discussed shortly, such efforts are unlikely.81
 
 
 
 
                                                          
79 A focus on unanimous voting may underestimate the actual extent of 
ideological disagreement on the court because some portion of unanimous cases  
reflect “getting along” behavior by judges who disagree slightly but not enough to 
expend the effort and the goodwill to register that disagreement in a formal dissent.  
See Jason J. Czarnezki and William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy?  An 
Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 Maryland L. Rev. ___ (2006) 
(forthcoming).   
80  From the litigant’s perspective, the prevalence of unanimity may be a signal 
that although the attitudinal model explains some judicial behavior, it doesn’t 
explain much.  What’s more, because it may be difficult for a litigant to predict 
before the fact which cases will be explained, the attitudinal model may not be 
operative in practice as a basis for litigant decisionmaking.  Even so, I am not 
claiming here that the reality of unanimity requires litigants to reach such a 
conclusion.  Quite to the contrary, it is almost certainly true that many litigants 
perceive significant panel distinctions regardless of reality.  My only point is that 
there may be a body of cases for which litigants do not perceive panel effects, and 
for those cases the impact of the panel announcement cue will be minimal.   
81 For a fuller discussion of the court’s almost certain hesitance to embrace an 
active role in promoting the attitudinal model of judging, see text accompanying 
notes 89-91.  
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2. Ineffectiveness due to lack of relevance 
 
 In the paradigmatic case, a plaintiff seeks something from the 
defendant that the defendant could provide but would prefer not to.  
Money is a fitting example of the thing at issue, although demands 
such as promotions in employment cases or admission to school in 
affirmative action cases also fit.  Ultimately, settlement is plausible 
because both parties have an interest in minimizing costs and because 
the plaintiff does not particularly care whether the thing sought is 
provided by agreement or by court order.  But some cases are 
different.  Consider for example a plaintiff who wants a judgment 
officially entered against a defendant to satisfy a desire to have 
wrongdoing publicly and officially acknowledged.  The key difference 
here is that the defendant is not in a position to readily provide that 
which the plaintiff seeks.  The plaintiff is not interested in a thing that 
can be awarded by judgment, but is instead interested in a judgment 
per se.  Settlement may not be possible in such cases even if both 
parties agree on the likely outcome and even if significant costs can be 
saved.82  As a result, the disclosure of panel information will produce 
no effect – even if it clarifies the likely outcome – because it is not 
relevant to the litigant’s decisions.  As with weak cues, the court 
cannot easily remedy an irrelevant cue because nothing short of a 
judgment will satisfy the parties.       
 
3. Ineffectiveness due to insufficient cost savings 
 
A final possibility is that panel announcement has limited 
effect due to the timing of its release.  Even though announcement in 
the D.C. Circuit comes very early in relative terms, it still may not 
come early enough in the process to make significant cost savings 
available.  As Richard Revesz has pointed out, if the ratio of pre-
announcement litigation costs to total litigation costs is sufficiently 
high, then “announcing the panel before all the litigation costs have 
been expended is equivalent to announcing it after all such costs have 
                                                          
82 To be clear, I am not making a general claim here about cases involving non-
monetary remedies.  In many such cases a plaintiff will readily accept money instead 
of the non-monetary remedy being sought.  Rather, the point is that some litigants 
may be hesitant to do so, and that an interest in a judgment per se can make 
settlement less likely.  See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 434 (2004). 
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been expended.”83  The question then is whether the announcement 
comes early enough to offer the prospect of cost savings that will 
outweigh the costs of negotiating the settlement.  The D.C. Circuit’s 
procedure generally reveals panel composition before briefing is 
completed, and in these instances appreciable cost savings should be 
available.  But occasionally the announcement is made after briefs 
have been filed, and in those cases the available cost savings may be 
quite low (primarily the costs of preparing for and conducting oral 
argument).  
To improve the impact of the panel composition cue, the court 
could move the announcement to an earlier stage of the appeals 
process.  This would increase the savings that post-announcement 
settlement provides.  At a minimum, the court should ensure that 
announcement always precedes the completion of briefing.  Other 
more dramatic options include announcing panel composition at the 
time that a notice of appeal is filed or even at the time that a lower 
court reaches a final judgment.  Although these latter approaches 
would maximize available cost savings, they have the potential to 
backfire.  Very early release of panel composition presents an 
opportunity for prospective appellants to obtain valuable information 
about likely outcome at a very low price, and that may draw parties 
into the appeals process who would otherwise steer clear.84  Put 
differently, early announcement produces two countervailing effects.  
Many cases that would appeal regardless of the announcement 
procedure may settle after the panel is announced, reducing the 
number of cases that the court must decide.  But some cases that are 
appealed precisely because of the announcement procedure may not 
settle after the panel is announced, thereby increasing that number of 
cases.  If the latter group is larger than the former, the move toward 
                                                          
83 See Revesz, supra note 55, at 697.  In cases where relatively few costs would 
be saved by pursuing a settlement, a party may decide to carry out an appeal 
notwithstanding the announcement of an unfavorable panel.  That decision could 
result because the cost of conducting the settlement negotiations is equal to or 
greater than the cost of completing the appeal, or because the party makes a 
calculated decision to pay the relatively minimal additional fees to carry out the 
appeal to purchase an option on the possibility that the appeal will defy prediction. 
84 See id. at 696-97.  Indeed, Revesz suggests that as a theoretical matter this 
effect should already be occurring. Id. at 709 (“[T]he D.C. Circuit practice induces 
the litigation of cases that would not be pursued at all under the majority practice.”).  
But it is difficult to assess whether theory has been translated into practice based on 
the data discussed in Part I.B because there is no reliable way to discern whether a 
given appeal would have been filed in the absence of the announcement regime. 
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earlier announcement will ultimately make the judges’ adjudicative 
burden worse rather than better.85
 
B. Response Failure 
 
The previous section discussed conditions in which the court’s 
informational cue may fail to alter litigant behavior because the cue 
itself is ineffective.  This section addresses conditions under which 
settlement activity may fail to occur even where the cue qualifies as 
effective in the abstract.  The conventional model of settlement 
behavior discussed in Part I.A assumes that both sides of a dispute 
treat information rationally.86  When new information is introduced, 
both sides are expected to process it accurately and integrate it into an 
updated outcome prediction.  But the assumption of rational behavior 
that pervades economic models of litigant behavior has been the 
subject of steady attack over the past twenty years.  If the rationality 
assumption does not hold, then the introduction of new information 
may not contribute to increased settlement activity.   
Three things must occur for a litigant to rationally process the 
informational cue that the D.C. Circuit provides.  The litigant must 
first notice that a cue has been provided, must then recognize that the 
cue contains relevant information, and must finally integrate that 
information accurately to form a new prediction of likely outcome.  
Errors that occur in the first two steps can sensibly be grouped 
together, and I will refer to both as ignorance errors.  Litigants making 
                                                          
85  As noted by Revesz, there is no way to predict theoretically which group of 
cases will be larger.  See id. at 708.  Also, it is important here to distinguish between 
the burden on the judges in particular and the burden on the court more generally.  
Even if earlier announcement leads to fewer cases that proceed to merits panels, the 
shift to earlier announcement might still increase the burden on the court due to the 
increased number of appeals filed in response to the cheap availability of relevant 
information.  But increasing the overall burden on the court while reducing the 
burden on judges might be a sensible tradeoff, given that it is relatively easier (and 
less expensive) to modify non-judge staffing levels. 
Ultimately, I am not as concerned with the particulars of the relative magnitudes 
of these effects as I am with discerning whether the cue and response model 
produces effects at all.  If Revesz is right, then the early announcement procedure 
may have the effect of increasing the number of appeals filed.  But there still should 
be settlement activity generated, and that settlement activity will be influenced by 
the barriers discussed here and will create distortions of the sort discussed in Part III.    
86 See Priest & Klein, supra note 52, at 4 (“The most important assumption of 
the model is that potential litigants form rational estimates of the likely decision.”). 
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ignorance errors do not respond to the informational cue, either 
because they do not notice it or because they wrongly consider it 
beside the point.87  In contrast, errors that occur at the final step arise 
because parties attempt to respond to the informational cue but make 
mistakes when doing so.  Missteps made while processing new 
information are common, and here they may inhibit the cue’s 
effectiveness by contributing to skewed interpretations of its impact on 
likely outcome. 
 
1. Ignorance errors 
 
Ignorance errors result when a party does not notice that a cue 
has been provided, or when the party notices the cue but fails to 
recognize that it contains relevant information.  The manner in which 
the court’s informational cue is conveyed contributes to the existence 
of ignorance errors.  Three general models are possible, which I will 
refer to as models of availability, disclosure and publicity.  In an 
availability model, the court makes information available but leaves it 
up to the parties to acquire the information.  In a disclosure model, the 
court makes the information available and takes the additional step of 
affirmatively providing that information to the litigants.  In a publicity 
model, the court not only discloses the information to the parties but 
also emphasizes its importance and relevance.   
As an intuitive matter, ignorance errors presumably decrease as 
the court becomes more active in transmitting the informational cue.  
A relatively attentive and engaged litigant who constantly and 
rationally updates expectations regarding likely outcome may 
nevertheless miss a cue if it is only available upon inquiry.  This is 
particularly true if the litigant is unfamiliar with the peculiarities of a 
court’s practice and procedure and therefore unaware that a source of 
potentially relevant information exists.  Disclosure in these cases 
would remedy ignorance errors.  Similarly, publicity may cure 
                                                          
87 In some cases, it may be true that the composition of the panel is unrelated to 
the outcome of the appeal; for instance, in cases clearly governed by a binding 
Supreme Court precedent.  If parties in those cases fail to update their outcome 
predictions in response to panel announcement, they should not be considered 
irrational (although some other source of irrational behavior might explain why an 
appeal was filed at all in those circumstances).  Instead, the irrational moniker 
applies only in those cases where updating would be possible, but is not even 
attempted because of a failure to recognize the informational cue provided by the 
panel announcement.  
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ignorance errors if there is a class of litigants who would update 
predictions in response to relevant information but who fail to 
recognize the relevance of a given piece of information.    
The D.C. Circuit’s early announcement procedure is an 
example of a disclosure-style cue.  The cue is conveyed by including 
the names of the judges who will compose the panel in the order 
scheduling oral argument.  Because the parties receive that order 
directly, the cue is affirmatively presented rather than simply made 
available.  But because the court does not highlight the information or 
explain its potential importance, litigants themselves must draw 
appropriate conclusions from the disclosure.   
An obvious way for the D.C. Circuit to improve the 
procedure’s effectiveness is to shift from a disclosure model toward a 
publicity model.  This shift might take various forms.  The most subtle 
change would disclose the information in an isolated order.  When 
many pieces of information are conveyed at once, there is an increased 
likelihood that some of the information will be overlooked or 
misunderstood by the recipient.88  Here, litigants may focus on other 
information conveyed in the oral argument order – e.g., the date of the 
argument and the time allocated to each side – and thus may fail to 
take proper notice of panel composition.  Conveying composition in 
an isolated order should therefore improve the likelihood that litigants 
will detect the cue and consider its potential relevance.  This shift is 
attractive because it costs very little and because judges are unlikely to 
view it as objectionable on other grounds.  Realistically, however, the 
class of litigants who would notice and respond to panel composition 
when conveyed in isolation but who fail to notice and respond when 
conveyed along with other information is almost certainly quite small.  
For that reason, isolated disclosure ultimately looks like a modification 
that is agreeable but without much bite.  
To have more bite, the shift toward publicity needs to be more 
drastic.  One possibility is to accompany disclosure of panel 
composition information with a court notice indicating that litigants 
may find the disclosure useful in settlement negotiations.  A second 
possibility is disclosure accompanied by a detailed report of how the 
                                                          
88 For discussions of this phenomenon in other contexts, see Richard Craswell, 
Taking Disclosure Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law 
and Elsewhere, 92 VIRGINIA L. REV. 565, 581-86 (2006); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded 
by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 
81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 441-44 (2003). 
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assigned panel has voted in past cases.  Either of these options would 
take the court firmly into the territory of a publicity model and would 
improve the extent to which litigants notice the composition 
information and recognize its importance.  Indeed, either of the 
approaches just discussed should come close to eliminating existing 
ignorance errors. 
Even so, the D.C. Circuit is unlikely to embrace such 
alternatives because they are unattractive for other reasons.  As 
discussed in Part I.A, judges are generally careful to publicly adopt 
formalist stances and to resist any admission that judicial 
characteristics affect judicial decisions.  In the context of the federal 
courts of appeals, there are at least two reasons to explain that 
behavior.  First, judges may consider the formalist view as crucial to 
public acceptance of the independent judiciary.  Along these lines, 
Judge Wald has emphasized that “[f]or our citizens to have confidence 
in the courts’ decisions, they must be convinced that judges are 
impartial as to litigants, including the state, and that we are not 
embarked on personal ideological crusades.”89  A second reason is 
unique to the appellate context.  Appeals courts alone in the federal 
system must support a fiction of a unified court composed of judges 
who decide individual cases in randomly assigned panels.90  
Intuitively, that distinction seems a likely source of pressure to keep 
up appearances of formality because acknowledgments of attitudinal 
effects can destabilize the fiction of the unified court. 
Indeed, even Judge Edwards’s support for the early 
announcement procedure is hedged by a simultaneous desire to 
maintain a formalist posture.  Rather than arguing that early 
announcement should promote settlement because it will actually 
provide useful information to litigants, Judge Edwards bases his 
support on a claim that litigants will mistakenly perceive that the 
                                                          
89  Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-Life Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L. 
REV. 173, 182 (1992). 
90 The district courts lack the characteristic of a unified court because they are 
not bound by decisions reached by other judges in the same court.  The Supreme 
Court lacks the characteristic of permutation because it is composed of a single panel 
that hears all cases.  Having said that, the Supreme Court confronts this difficulty to 
some extent because the composition of its single panel changes over time.  But the 
passage of time itself provides a natural alternative explanation for the Court to 
explain different outcomes that are reached in similar cases without having to 
acknowledge that differences in Court composition may be at least equally 
influential. 
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information is useful.91  By crafting the argument in this way, Judge 
Edwards can support both the early announcement procedure and the 
formalist model of judging.  But this argument makes sense only if the 
court limits its role to the disclosure of the panel announcement cue.  
If the court instead becomes actively involved in instructing litigants 
about the cue’s potential relevance, it becomes nearly impossible to 
keep up the ghost of judicial formalism.  In short, the court is likely to 
view a meaningful move toward publicity as an acknowledgment that 
the attitudinal model has merit.  Such an admission would almost 
certainly constitute an unacceptable price to pay to improve the 
operation of the early announcement procedure, regardless of its 
potential effect.   
 
2. Perception errors 
 
Perception errors result when litigants notice the informational 
cue and respond to it, but make mistakes when doing so.  As an 
example, numerous studies demonstrate that individuals have a 
“persistent tendency to integrate new information in a self-serving 
fashion.”92  As a result of this confirmatory or self-serving bias, the 
disclosure of identical information may not lead to updated predictions 
in different directions.  Law students, for instance, interpret factual 
information related differently if they are assigned a hypothetical side 
to represent before the information is disclosed.93  Under the 
traditional law-and-economics theory, appeals are filed when there is a 
                                                          
91 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (referring to a “false assumption” or 
“false image” as the basis for procedure’s effect). 
92 Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks:  Why Do Cases Get 
Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1285 (2002).  For a more general discussion 
of the self-serving bias, see, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093 (2000); Linda Babcock et al., Biased 
Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337, 1342 (1995); 
George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial 
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 157-59 (1993).  For psychological studies 
detailing the “self-serving bias,” see Charles G. Lord, et al., Biased Assimilation and 
Attitude Polarization:  The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered 
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Dale Griffin & Amos 
Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992). 
93 Babcock et. al., supra note 92, at 1342; Loewenstein et. al., supra note 92, at 
151-52. 
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difference between the appellant and appellee regarding likely 
outcome.94 The theory underlying the D.C. Circuit procedure is that 
disclosure of panel composition information may close that gap and 
thus make settlement between the two parties possible in some cases.  
But if the self-serving bias affects integration of panel information, 
then the gap between the parties may be unchanged and may even 
expand after the court provides an informational cue.95
As with ignorance errors, the most obvious way for the court to 
address these errors is to move toward publicity.  Again, the court 
might accompany the disclosure of panel composition information 
with a detailed analysis of what the information might imply.  That 
analysis might itself be subject to a self-serving bias, but the potential 
for that bias should decrease when the space to interpret new 
information in varying ways shrinks.  In other words, if the 
implications of new information are made explicit when disclosed, 
litigants are less able to create an interpretation that simply confirms 
pre-existing preferences.  Instead, the greater risk would be that 
litigants may fall victim to an overconfidence bias that would lead 
them to believe that their case is an outlier.96  A different approach 
that may avoid these problems is to couple disclosure of panel 
composition information with a required settlement conference.  This 
requirement would contribute to a more objective interpretation of the 
information because it would force litigants to confront alternative 
interpretations of the information that they might otherwise neglect.97
In either case, the court is again thrust into a position of 
combating errors by adopting a more active role in the dissemination 
of its informational cue.  This highlights a general difficulty.  Because 
a publicity model provides the greatest opportunity for the court to 
control how litigants interpret and respond to its cue, it is the optimal 
approach for minimizing perception errors, however they arise.  At the 
                                                          
94 See Priest & Klein, supra note 52, at 12; see also Robert D. Cooter & Daniel 
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 3 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1067 (1989). 
95 See Issacharoff, supra note 92, at 1285 (“Rather than bringing parties 
together, mutually shared common information can provide a fertile environment for 
disagreement and inefficient impasses.”). 
96 For a discussion of the overconfidence bias, see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 
92, at 1091-93.   
97 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 92, at 1094 (suggesting that the self-serving 
bias “provides support for legal structures that require litigating parties to view the 
facts of a dispute through the eyes of their opponents”).    
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same time, for reasons previously explained, a move toward a 
publicity model is not viable because it requires a level of 
interventionism beyond that which the court will accept.  In short, the 
court is almost certainly unwilling to move beyond a disclosure model, 
and that unwillingness means that the court must leave the 
interpretation of the cue almost entirely in the hands of litigants – and 
must accept perception errors when they occur.    
In sum, the D.C. Circuit might address both ignorance and 
perception errors by changing the way it conveys panel announcement 
information.  But significant movement from the status quo toward a 
publicity model is unlikely.  A slight move in the form of isolated 
disclosure would be potentially acceptable but ineffective.  Any 
greater move is likely to butt up against the court’s interest in 
maintaining a perception of panel neutrality, and is thus potentially 
effective but unacceptable.  Accordingly, existing ignorance and 
perception errors are an intractable hindrance to the success of an early 
announcement procedure, at least in terms of settlement promotion.  
The implications for that intractability are taken up in Part III.  
 
III. DISTORTIONS CREATED BY EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT   
 
The preceding discussion suggested various barriers that 
impede the effectiveness of the D.C. Circuit’s early announcement 
cue, and concluded that procedural modifications to address those 
barriers are likely to be either ineffective or unacceptable.  This Part 
examines how those barriers might affect the procedure’s operation in 
practice.  In particular, it describes and evaluates three ways that the 
procedure distorts the body of cases reaching oral argument.  None of 
these distortions are likely to be dramatic or extreme.  But each may 
have marginal effects on the content of cases that proceed to a merits 
decision, and on the way that those cases are presented to and decided 
by their assigned panels.      
   
A. The Predictability Distortion  
 
If early announcement works at all, it works best and most 
often in cases where the cue is strong, that is, where the panel 
announcement gives litigants a strong indication of likely outcome.  
Predictability distortions exist because the strength of panel 
information is not uniform and varies based on the predictability of the 
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judges and the predictability of the legal issues involved.  Because of 
these irregularities, the procedure affects the types of cases that 
proceed to oral argument and the composition of the panels who hear 
them.  In particular, early announcement maximizes updating and the 
creation of new settlement zones when litigants perceive the 
announced panel to be particularly predictable.  Conversely, settlement 
is less likely when the announced cue is perceived to be unpredictable. 
As a result, an early announcement procedure should be expected to 
increase the extent to which oral argument cases involve unpredictable 
panels.98   
Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge have articulated precisely 
this expectation.  After analyzing voting patterns and approaches to 
claim construction in the Federal Circuit, Wagner and Petherbridge 
first conclude that although many members of the court are 
predictable, about half do not have “predictable effects on outcomes 
when empanelled.”99  Based on this predictability divide, they then 
predict that an early announcement procedure would result in a “larger 
proportion of opinions [would be] decided by panels (and written by 
judges) that are less predictable.” 100 And because they believe that 
this by-product of the procedure “could have long-term negative 
effects on the overall performance of the court,” they ultimately 
caution against its adoption.101
 Wagner and Petherbridge do not provide an account for their 
jurisprudential concern, instead asserting the “long-term negative 
effects” as something of a given.  But it is easy to imagine such effects 
in the extreme case.  If the effect of the procedure is very dramatic, the 
court will appear to be pre-announcing results in many cases when it 
announces panels.  This is efficient, perhaps,102 but unsatisfactory in 
light of the two traditional aims of a judicial system.103  To begin, 
                                                          
98  To be a bit more precise, what should really be expected is that oral argument 
cases should involve relatively more panels that are perceived by litigants to be 
unpredictable.    
99 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 21, at 1175. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. 
102 It may not even be efficient, for reasons discussed infra at notes 85.  
103 Virtually every theory of adjudication recognizes that a judicial system must 
serve two general goals, which Chad Oldfather has recently referred to as “points of 
fundamental agreement” in contemporary discussions of adjudication and 
adjudicative duty.  Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism, 94 GEO L.J. 
121, 137 (2005).  First, a judicial system must provide an outlet for dispute 
resolution.  See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 Stan. L. 
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when the court resolves disputes by pre-announcing results, there is no 
caselaw created to guide behavior and reduce the need for future resort 
to the legal system.  More importantly, the manner of resolving 
disputes is itself problematic because litigants will view it as random 
and unfair.  Although fairness has been viewed as “of secondary 
importance” relative to the need for the system to guarantee resolution 
that is peaceful,104 perceptions of unfairness can be devastating 
because litigants are unlikely to submit to an unfair system 
voluntarily.105  Over time, the procedure threatens to cultivate a 
perception of illegitimacy because litigants are deprived of a 
meaningful opportunity to participate in the dispute resolution 
process.106   
For the reasons discussed in Part II, however, this concern is 
unrealistic because the procedure will almost certainly never produce 
                                                                                                                                         
Rev. 937, 937-38 (1975).  The judicial system can act only when presented with a 
dispute, and as a result resolution of disputes is in many ways a court’s archetypal 
function.  I will refer to this function as the court’s “dispute resolution function.”  
But of course that is not all that a judicial system does, nor all that we expect it to do.  
Instead, courts – and particularly appellate courts – issue opinions not only to 
formalize the resolution of the dispute (and perhaps to legitimize that resolution by 
convincing the litigants that their participation was regarded, see Lon L. Fuller, The 
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978)), but also to 
establish legal rules that will shape and govern the behavior of parties not privy to 
the specific dispute being resolved.  See Oldfather, supra at 137-38.  I will refer to 
this as the court’s “caselaw production function.”  Disagreement – sometimes fierce 
disagreement –  exists as to the relative importance of these two functions, but the 
dual nature of adjudication is not in much dispute.  See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
1-7 (1985). 
104 See, Scott, supra note 103, at 937 (“[I]t is more important for society that the 
dispute be settled peaceably than that it be settled in any particular way.”). 
105 See Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary 
System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 304 (1989) (noting that a system that resolves disputes in 
an arbitrary way would not be perceived as fair, and that “[c]itizens would not 
voluntarily submit to such a system”).  To be sure, the resolution of disputes here is 
not quite as random as the proverbial coin flip because the outcome does bear some 
relationship to the overall composition of the court, which might in turn be related to 
some notion of public representation.  Even so, the resolution is random enough to 
raise unfairness concerns.   
106 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 277-81 
(2004).  To be sure, formal participatory rights exist here, and we might not credit 
claims of illegitimacy from those who have opted not to exercise them.  At the same 
time, there is cause for concern if the reason that litigants are opting out is that they 
perceive no possibility that their input will influence the court’s decision. 
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an extreme effect.  And indeed these kinds of extreme difficulties do 
not appear to be what Wagner and Petherbridge are getting at when 
they decry the increased influence of unpredictable judges and panels.  
Instead, their claim seems subtler.  Predictability is commonly viewed 
as one of the “essential factors in the proper operation of the rule of 
law.”107 If the rule increases the number of cases decided by 
unpredictable panels and judges, we might expect the level of 
unpredictability in the caselaw to rise as well.  In other words, the 
claim is that the announcement procedure would ultimately threaten 
the stability and coherence of the caselaw, which outweighs any 
possible benefit the procedure might have in terms of caseload 
reduction.   
 Despite the intuitive appeal of that account, there is reason to 
question its legitimacy.   Consider again the “panel effects” studies by 
Revesz, Sunstein and others discussed in Part I, and particularly the 
impact of “group polarization.”108  Group polarization describes the 
process by which groups of like-minded individuals reinforce and 
amplify each other’s judgments.  When this occurs, the result of 
deliberation is that “groups end up adopting a more extreme version of 
their predeliberation tendencies.”109  Applied to the context of 
appellate decisionmaking, group polarization may help to explain why 
panels consisting exclusively of members of one ideological group 
vote in ways that are more extreme than those containing an 
ideological mix.  If no panel effects existed, we would expect there to 
be no difference in outcomes between one panel composed of three 
predictable conservatives and another composed of two predictable 
conservatives and a predictable liberal (or an unpredictable).  In both 
cases, the two predictable conservatives should outvote the remaining 
member, thereby making that third member irrelevant.  But as an 
                                                          
107 Larry D. Thompson Jr., Adrift On A Sea Of Uncertainty: Preserving 
Uniformity In Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference To The Federal Circuit, 
92 GEO. L.J. 523, 589 (2004). See also Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About 
Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).  
108 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
109 Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 340.  Three primary explanations for the 
group polarization phenomenon have been suggested: (1) People inclined to a 
position will have that position reinforced and head in a more extreme direction 
when all members of the group share a similar initial position; (2) Members of a 
group seek the approval of the other members and will air their opinion in a way 
favorable to the other members of the group; and (3) The similarity of view points in 
a group lends confidence to an individual member’s ideas and therefore enables a 
more confident assertion of extreme ideas. Id. at 341-343. 
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empirical matter, that third member seems to matter after all, as 
ideologically split panels vote differently than ideologically uniform 
ones. 
The impact of ideological amplification is not limited to 
voting.  Although extremely difficult to measure, the suspicion is that 
the content of written judicial opinions may be affected by ideological 
amplification as well.110  Along those lines, Emerson Tiller and Frank 
Cross have suggested that the presence of a non-uniform viewpoint 
can significantly affect the terms of an opinion, even if that viewpoint 
is not expressed in the form of a formal dissent.111  Part of the 
explanation for that may be that the writing judge responds to the 
threat of a dissent, and consciously moderates the opinion from a more 
extreme form in order to achieve unanimity.  But perhaps even more 
plausible is that no conscious moderation occurs; instead, the opinion 
is less extreme because the presence of ideological diversity naturally 
moderates the decisionmaking of the drafter.  In either case, the end 
result is that ideological amplification may impact the performance of 
a panel’s dispute resolution function (by affecting the direction in 
which a dispute is decided) as well as its caselaw production function 
(by affecting the terms of the opinion expressing that decision). 
The possibility of group polarization and ideological 
amplification forms the basis for Cass Sunstein’s recent arguments in 
favor of ideological diversity on panels.112  Panels composed of judges 
representing varying viewpoints are more likely to identify the correct 
outcome in cases where one outcome is clearly preferable, and are 
more likely to reach a moderate outcome in cases where no clearly 
preferable outcome exists.  In cases where there is a clearly correct 
outcome, “[t]he existence of diversity on a three-judge panel is likely 
to bring that fact to light and to move the panel’s decision in the 
direction of what the law actually requires.  The existence of 
politically diverse judges, and of a potential dissenter-whistleblower, 
increases the chance that the law will be followed.”113  In cases where 
the correct outcome is less clear, we might also benefit from 
ideological diversity, either because “through that route more 
                                                          
110 See Cross & Tiller, supra note 48, at 2156-2157. See also Sunstein et al., 
supra note 109, at 309. 
111 See Cross & Tiller, supra note 48, at 2174. 
112 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003); Sunstein et 
al., supra note 48, at 353. 
113 Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 185.  See also Cross & Tiller, supra note 48, 
at 2172.  
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(reasonable) opinions are likely to be heard,”114 or because the varying 
viewpoints will have a “moderating effect” that is desirable in cases of 
genuine uncertainty.115  In short, diversity of viewpoints improves the 
accuracy and consistency of the court’s decisionmaking when viewed 
as a whole.   
But even if ideological diversity on panels is considered 
desirable in theory, it is difficult to guarantee in practice.  The 
fundamental problem is that a project of creating ideologically diverse 
panels is in direct tension with the current practice of random 
assignment.116  Although serious proposals have been suggested that 
deviate from random assignment in the pursuit of ideological 
diversity,117 garnering support for those proposals is difficult because 
                                                          
114 Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 186. 
115 Id. (“[I]f we are genuinely uncertain about what judges should do, we have 
reason to favor a mix of views merely by virtue of its moderating effect.  In the face 
of uncertainty, sensible people choose between the poles.”). 
116 As an alternative solution to systematic deviation from random assignment, 
Sunstein has suggested that the Senate step up its “advice and consent” role in an 
effort to promote diversity in the federal judiciary.  Id. at 189-90.  In the current 
climate, this seems politically implausible.  But plausibility aside, Sunstein’s 
suggestion remains unsatisfactory at the level of the appellate courts because an 
ideologically diverse pool of appellate judges can still generate ideologically 
uniform panels (although it is true that a diverse pool is less likely to do so).  In 
short, imposition of ideological diversity at the nomination and confirmation stage is 
best suited for the Supreme Court, where the pool and the panel are identical.  
117 Two possibilities have been suggested.  Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross have 
proposed an assignment procedure that explicitly takes account of judicial ideology 
in an effort to create balanced panels. Tiller & Cross, supra note 48.  The authors 
note that in 1992 the chance of getting a politically split panel by random assignment 
was only 58%.  Id. at 227.  The probability of getting a three-Republican panel was 
41%, while the probability of getting a three-Democrat panel was only about 1%.  
Furthermore, they cite recent studies indicating that ideological voting is especially 
pronounced in cases where the “circuit court panel is unified with like-minded 
partisans (3-0 panels of Democratic or Republican appointees).” Tiller & Cross, 
supra note 47, at 215, citing Cross & Tiller, supra note 48, at 2168-72.  To 
counteract these effects, they suggest a method for selection that would guarantee at 
least one member from each party on every appellate panel. This method entails 
selecting one judge from each political party – again, as measured by the party of the 
nominating President – and then choosing a third judge from all of the remaining 
judges.  “The result would be all split panels, with the ratio of majority party panels 
dependent on the ratio within the circuit as a whole.”  Tiller & Cross, supra note 47, 
at 232-234. For a criticism of this proposal, see Patricia M. Wald, Colloquy: A 
Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235 (1999). 
Alternatively, Michael Hasday has suggested a complex assignment system 
based on the expressed preferences of the litigants. Hasday, supra note 47, at 291.  
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they require the court itself to play an active part in addressing the 
problematic influence of attitudinal effects.118   
The distortion created by non-uniform panel predictability may 
offer a roundabout solution. Because the announcement of less 
predictable panels is less likely to lead to settlement, and because 
those less predictable panels are more likely to be ideologically 
diverse, the procedure should encourage ideological diversity on 
panels that ultimately decide cases and write opinions.119  And it 
                                                                                                                                         
That proposal avoids an explicit recognition that the politics of judges matter, but 
might still lead to panel assignments that are more neutral than random assignment.  
In her criticism of the Tiller & Cross proposal, Judge Wald expressed concern that 
the explicit acknowledgment of a politicized judiciary would “change[] radically the 
public’s and the judge’s own perception of her role.” Wald, supra at 254-55.  By 
contrast, Hasday’s approach attempts to “avoid[] any explicit mixing of politics with 
the judiciary.” Hasday, supra at 306.  
Technically, the goal of those proposals is to achieve neutral panels rather than 
ideologically diverse ones.  But the two goals would almost certainly overlap.  In the 
Tiller and Cross proposal, the overlap is explicit, at least to the extent that 
ideological diversity is achieved by composing panels of judges from both parties.  
See Tiller & Cross, supra note 43.  In the Hasday proposal, the overlap is not explicit 
but is very likely.  By responding to litigant preferences, which if rational and 
accurate should be as ideologically opposed as possible, the proposal should promote 
ideological diversity. See Hasday, supra note 47. 
118 The Tiller and Cross proposal requires the most explicit acknowledgment, 
and that aspect of the proposal was an important basis for Judge Wald’s criticism.  
See Wald, supra note 117.  Given the strong judicial defense of formalism and 
neutrality, see text accompanying notes 30-30, other judges are likely to react 
similarly.  The Hasday proposal is perhaps less problematic in this regard because it 
consciously avoids explicit recognition of ideological effects through the mechanism 
of “matching” panels based on expressed party preferences.  See Hasday, supra note 
47.  Even so, the proposal must be administered by the court, and the basis (or at 
least the likely perceived basis) for using its complex assignment mechanism rather 
than random assignment would be as a means of addressing ideological effects.    
119  A difference between composition in the voluntary dismissal cases and oral 
argument cases would support the concept of a predictability distortion.  Along those 
lines, consider again the data discussed in Part I.B. The following table shows the 
panel composition of D.C. Circuit cases dismissed by party and those proceeding to 
oral argument, as well as the expected distribution given the overall court 
composition.   
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should do so without requiring excessive active participation by the 
court. 120   If so, the concern expressed by Wagner and Petherbridge is 
misplaced.  In short, the distortion created by non-uniform panel 
predictability may ultimately provide a jurisprudential benefit in the 
form of opinions that are more accurate, more restrained, and more 
consistent from the perspective of the court as a whole.121  
                                                                                                                                         
 Dismissed by Party 
Oral 
Argument Expected 
RRR 2 (15.4%) 
5 
(10.2%) 16.7% 
RRD 6 (46.2%) 
25 
(51.0%) 50.0% 
RDD 5 (38.5%) 
13 
(26.5%) 30.0% 
DDD 1 (7.7%) 
6 
(12.2%) 3.3% 
Total 13 (99.9%) 
49 
(100.0%) 100.0% 
 
Obviously, the sample size is small enough that these results are not statistically 
significant; a larger scale study might provide a better sense of the existence and 
practical effect of a predictability distortion. 
120 Obviously the court is still required to participate in the form of announcing 
the panel composition.  But this level of participation is not likely to be considered 
as problematic, perhaps because the court can plausibly claim to be providing the 
information for unrelated reasons (e.g., Edwards’ “convenience of the parties” 
explanation, supra note 18), or perhaps because the court is not altering its 
assignment practices in response to attitudinal effects. 
121 Richard Revesz has suggested yet another possibility:  In some cases, 
announcement of a very predictable panel may not lead to greater settlement activity 
at all.  Instead, the favored party may opt to pursue the appeal and make more 
extreme arguments in the hope of getting a particularly favorable opinion that will be 
useful in future cases.  See Revesz, supra note 55, at 700-01.  This would imply that 
the expectation of a predictability-based distortion is misguided.  But this response is 
more likely where the favored party is a repeat player with an interest in the rule 
value created by an appeal.  A one-time player interest only in the judgment should 
maximize utility by pursuing settlement.  In other words, what Revesz’ insight really 
captures is differences in the way litigants will respond to panel announcement based 
on their ultimate interest in the appeal.  For more on this, see infra Part III.C. 
 At least two other effects created by the predictability distortion are 
possible.   First, the distortion can mislead potential litigants.  When cases settle in 
response to the announcement of a predictable panel, the panel’s vote on the legal 
issues represented by the appeal is effectively not recorded.  In essence, the panel 
performs its conflict resolution function without getting a chance to perform its 
caselaw production function.  The effect is similar to a panel choosing to file a short 
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B. The Sophistication Distortion 
 
A second distortion is created by the existence of ignorance and 
perception errors,122 and more specifically by the fact that those errors 
are not likely to be evenly distributed across litigants.  Instead, 
litigants that I will call sophisticated are more likely to use the cue 
                                                                                                                                         
nonprecedential opinion to dispatch an appeal on the merits, but the difference is that 
the panel here does not control the choice.  And while this is always true of panels 
assigned to hear appeals that settle prior to a merits decision, in most cases the 
settlement activity it is safe to assume that there is no systematic effect created 
because the activity is not responsive to the panel itself.  Here, the situation is quite 
different.  Decisions are not being entered precisely because of the panel 
composition, and the distribution of those excluded panels is not random.  This is 
potentially misleading because parties might reasonably consult the recorded 
decisions of the court either to determine whether to file an appeal or to guide their 
behavior in the hopes of avoiding the litigation process altogether.  That consultation 
might lead to distorted predictions if certain votes of the court are essentially 
invisible because they led to settlement rather than some more formal judicial action. 
Second, the potential for a predictability distortion may affect the way that 
judges themselves behave.  For example, some judges may motivated by a desire to 
minimize the amount of work that they must perform on the court.  Judges interested 
in shirking might seek to make themselves as predictable as possible.  Predictable 
judges are most likely to sit on predictable panels, and predictable panels lead to 
more settlement and less judicial effort.  But the process of becoming predictable 
itself requires judicial effort because the judge can no longer simply minimize 
participation on panels by writing majority opinions when assigned and simply 
going along with the majority in all other cases.  Instead, the shirking judge must 
cultivate a perception of predictability by writing (presumably short) dissents in 
some cases.  In sum, whether an early announcement procedure creates an 
opportunity for a shirking judge depends on whether the effort saved by being 
perceived as predictable outweighs the effort required to create that perception.  
Other judges may be interested in maximizing their influence on the caselaw.  A 
predictability distortion might encourage an influence maximizer to become 
unpredictable, which would maximize her placement on unpredictable panels.  But 
again, the actions required to become unpredictable threaten to undermine the 
overarching goal of maximizing influence on the caselaw.  As a result, the influence 
maximizer might instead choose to write strong and consistent opinions, even though 
that consistency may have the auxiliary effect of reducing the number of panels on 
which she sits.  The choice between these two options should depend on the overall 
effectiveness of the early announcement procedure and on the number of other 
predictable members of the court.  A choice to become unpredictable makes sense 
only if the effect of the procedure is dramatic.  Because of the various barriers 
discussed in Part II, that condition is unlikely to be met; the predictability distortion 
is therefore unlikely to affect the behavioral incentives of influence maximizing 
judges. 
122 See supra Part II.B. 
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more accurately and more often.  As a result, the early announcement 
procedure will select those litigants out of the oral argument pool at a 
higher rate than unsophisticated ones.  Over time, the cases that 
proceed to panel decisions on the merits will involve relatively greater 
numbers of unsophisticated litigants.123
 The question is whether this sophistication-based distortion 
should be viewed as problematic.  The answer depends in part on 
whether sophisticated and unsophisticated litigants behave differently 
in other relevant respects.  If they do not, the distortion would not 
matter at all.  But this is unlikely.  Instead, sophisticated litigants are 
likely to differ from unsophisticated ones in terms of the quality of the 
claims brought and the manner in which those claims are presented.  
Consider first the quality of claims.  Unsophisticated parties may be 
expected to appeal relatively weaker cases.  Ordinarily, rational actors 
should file appeals only if the expected outcome from doing so 
exceeds the cost of the appeal, and that is most likely to happen when 
the quality of the appeal is high.124 But what makes parties 
unsophisticated under this definition is that they are for some reason 
                                                          
123 Assuming a simple two-party dispute, three different party arrays are 
possible:  Sophisticated vs. Sophisticated (SS), Sophisticated vs. Unsophisticated 
(SU), and Unsophisticated vs. Unsophisticated (UU).  The reaction to the 
announcement of a highly predictable panel is not uniform across these arrays.  In an 
SS dispute, both sides will use the information to settle, and the case will not 
proceed to a merits decision.  In a UU dispute, no settlement will result, either 
because the parties will not react at all or because they will interpret the information 
in a self-serving way.  In an SU dispute, the results are mixed.  If the panel favors the 
sophisticated party, no settlement will result because the settlement demands of the 
sophisticated party will appear too steep to the unsophisticated party.  If the panel 
instead favors the unsophisticated party, settlement may occur because the 
sophisticated party’s offer will look attractive relative to the unsophisticated party’s 
expected outcome.  Of course, a party unsophisticated in the sense of not making use 
of panel announcement information may also be unsophisticated in the sense of 
making an accurate outcome prediction absent that information.  If so, and if the 
unsophisticated party has a distorted “expected outcome,” then settlement may not 
occur because the offer may yet appear unsatisfactory.  Moreover, if the 
sophisticated party is aware that the other party is unsophisticated, the terms of the 
settlement may be affected.  Whereas the terms for an SS dispute should be very 
close to the new (and mutually held) expected value, the settlement for an SU dispute 
may be close to the unsophisticated party’s old expected value. 
124 See generally Shavell, supra note 52, at 401-11.  But not all appeals will 
involve a positive expected value; for discussions on the possibilities for negative 
value suits, see id. at 419-423; see also, Lucian A. Bebchuk,  Suits with Negative 
Expected Value, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 551-54 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
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unwilling or unable to engage in the expected outcome assessment that 
would lead to a post-cue response.  Because the original decision 
regarding the quality and likely success of the appeal is based on a 
similar assessment, the lack of sophistication will sabotage both.  In 
short, appeals that present low quality claims are frequently a function 
of misguided notions about chances for success, and unsophisticated 
litigants are more likely to be misguided.   
Even in cases where the underlying quality of the appeal is 
identical, a second sort of difference might exist: Sophisticated parties 
may present their appeal in a different manner than unsophisticated 
parties.  These differences might take various forms.  One significant 
possibility relates to how the issues in the case are framed for the 
court.  Issues related to an appeal can be presented or defended in any 
number of ways.  Suppose, for instance, that twelve plausible sources 
of error exist, but that only three stand a significant likelihood of 
success.  Some litigants will choose to include all twelve issues in an 
attempt to convince the court that something was amiss, while others 
will choose instead to focus only on the three potential “winners” on 
the theory that inclusion of the other nine may undermine their 
credibility in the eyes of the court.  Differences of this sort are not 
limited to contrasting views on litigation strategy.  In a given record, 
there may be numerous ways to theorize the legal claims involved.  A 
paradigmatic example is the choice between contract and tort theory as 
a basis for relief.  Whether related to strategy or to legal theory, 
sophisticated parties may make different framing choices than 
unsophisticated ones.  And because the ability to make those choices 
optimally may be related to the ability to successfully integrate new 
information, sophisticated parties may do a systematically better job of 
shaping arguments that will persuade an appellate court.   
Finally, there may also be differences in the quality of briefing 
as between unsophisticated and sophisticated litigants.  These 
differences might exist even if the merits of the underlying claims are 
identical, and even if the conception of how to frame those claims for 
purposes of the appeal is also identical.  Again, the intuition is that 
unsophisticated litigants are likely to file briefs that are of lower 
quality.  The basis for that intuition is that failure to respond to panel 
announcement might be viewed as a sign of incompetence, and 
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incompetence in that respect may be accompanied by incompetence in 
others.125
Because there is reason to believe that sophisticated and 
unsophisticated litigants will bring appeals that are different in quality 
and in presentation, a sophistication distortion may affect the court’s 
performance of its primary functions.  At the extreme, the distortion 
creates tension between the need for the court’s action to reflect the 
participation of the litigants, and the need for the court to resolve 
disputes and create legal rules in accordance with public values. The 
need to reflect litigant participation is connected to the norm of strong 
responsiveness developed by Lon Fuller in his posthumously 
published article The Forms and Limits of Adjudication.126  In order to 
preserve and guarantee participation by the parties, which he views as 
“the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication,”127 Fuller concludes 
that judges should assume a passive role and should – to the extent 
possible – structure their disposition of cases according to the way 
they have been presented by the parties.128   
In an article published concurrently with Fuller’s, Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg strengthened the norm by arguing that responsiveness to 
parties – and not just party participation alone – is what defines 
adjudication as a tool of dispute resolution.  A court fulfills its dispute 
resolution function only to the extent that it resolves the dispute that 
                                                          
125 A fourth difference might be that sophisticated and unsophisticated litigants 
file different types of appeals.  So for example, perhaps contract cases are likely to 
involve sophisticated parties while employment cases are likely to involve 
unsophisticated ones.  This difference is likely to cause an effect only if it is very 
extreme, so much so that it results in very few cases of particular types surviving to 
the merits stage.  Defining how many would qualify as “very few” would depend on 
the importance of incrementalism and adaptiveness in a given “type” of case.  If very 
few cases in a particular type are filed, the court may find it difficult to perform its 
caselaw production function adequately because it would not have sufficient 
occasion to issue opinions that would clarify the law for external actors.  This would 
be particularly so if the court feels constrained by notions of minimalism.  See CASS 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, (2001). See also Christopher J, Peters, Assessing 
The New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 454 (2000).    
126 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
353 (1978). 
127  Id. at 364. 
128  Id. at 388.  Fuller acknowledges that it is not always possible to structure 
disposition in this way, but he nevertheless urges courts to “work toward an 
achievement of the closest approximation of it.” Id. 
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the parties have perceived and presented, and to that end it does well 
to respond as directly as possible.129   
Although implicit in the work of both Fuller and Eisenberg, 
more recent arguments in favor of the norm of strong responsiveness 
have been explicitly rooted in terms of legitimacy.  For instance, Larry 
Solum has explored the link between strong responsiveness and 
perceptions of legitimacy by participants in the adjudicative 
process.130  Participants will view the resolution of their dispute as 
legitimate only if they participate in the resolution process in a 
meaningful way, and responsiveness is one sure way to assure parties 
that that condition has been met.  Systematic deviations from strong 
responsiveness threaten to disrupt legitimacy on the part of those who 
rely on the courts to resolve disputes.  Because parties will not 
voluntarily submit to illegitimate forms of adjudication, instability 
would follow.     
Strong responsiveness may also be necessary to secure 
legitimacy in the eyes of non-participants.  Christopher Peters has 
defended strong legitimacy as a guarantor of the democratic 
legitimacy of rules created and imposed by the judicial branch.131  
Responding to criticisms of adjudication as a fundamentally 
nondemocratic enterprise, Peters emphasizes the involvement 
throughout the adjudication process of interested parties,132 who 
perform valuable functions including:  initiating a case, framing the 
issues it presents, and representing the various interests implicated by 
those issues.133  Each of those functions limits the court’s discretion in 
fashioning a decisional rule that will bind other parties, but those 
limits are effective only to the extent that the court actually respects 
the parties’ input.  Strong responsiveness thus emerges as an essential 
                                                          
129 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the 
Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 413 (1978) 
(arguing that strong responsiveness is a necessary component of the court’s dispute 
resolution function “insofar as the parties contemplate that the court will settle their 
dispute on the basis of the issues as the parties see them”). 
130 Solum, supra note 106, at 275. 
131 Christopher Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312 
(1997). 
132 To ensure that the parties to disputes are indeed interested, Peters 
understandably encourages strict application of existing justiciability doctrines.  Id. 
at 428.  
133 Indeed, in Peters’ view, parties effectively “serve as interest representatives 
of subsequent litigants in much the same way that we expect our elected legislators 
to serve as interest representatives of their constituents.”  Id. at 347. 
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component of the court’s legitimate exercise of its caselaw production 
function.134
Whatever its merits in the abstract, strict adherence to a norm 
of strong responsiveness is not always desirable.  Of particular 
relevance here, the norm makes sense only when the quality of the 
appeals being decided is high.  Consider first dispute resolution.  
Fuller proposes that courts are primarily engaged in the arbitration of 
claims presented by competing parties.  That is all well and good, but 
precisely how are those competing claims to be resolved?  On one 
view, that is a question of minimal significance; so long as the parties 
are provided the opportunity to participate, and so long as the 
resolution is accepted by the parties themselves, the nature and manner 
of the resolution is irrelevant.  Indeed, this seems to be Fuller’s view, 
and his norms of attention, explanation and strong responsiveness are 
most consistent with that model of dispute resolution.  But perhaps 
dispute resolution requires something more.  On this broader view, 
proper resolution of competing claims must draw on, and be 
representative of, public values.  This is particularly so in so-called 
“public law” cases, where interests other than those presented by the 
two sides may be implicated and may need to be accounted for.135  But 
it may be true in more traditional cases as well.  According to Owen 
Fiss, perhaps the most ardent proponent of this view, “all rights 
enforced by courts are public.”136  If so, then the nature of the dispute 
resolution is a matter of concern after all; we feel confident that the 
                                                          
134 Peters identifies two further components that are essential to his model of 
adjudication as representation.  First, courts must correctly apply the doctrines of 
stare decisis such that a decision binds “only those future parties who are similarly 
situated to the original litigants in every meaningful way.”  Id. at 375.  Second, the 
“conduct of the parties litigating the precedential case [must] meet a threshold 
standard of adequacy.”  Id. at 376.  
135 The public law model of adjudication is most closely associated with Abram 
Chayes.  See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).  
136 Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term – Foreword:  The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1979).  Fiss’s view of adjudication led him to 
grossly minimize the court’s dispute resolution function.  Id. at 30 (“[C]ourts exist to 
give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes.”).  For that reason, he is 
often described as being concerned primarily with the court’s “lawmaking” function 
rather than its dispute resolution function.  See Oldfather, supra note 103, at 148-49.  
But of course courts must be in the business of resolving disputes at least at some 
nominal level, since by constitutional mandate there must be a dispute before there 
can be any court action at all.  And the emphasis placed on public values by Fiss can 
easily be framed in terms of a conception of how that resolution ought to occur. 
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dispute has been resolved properly only if the resolution reflects public 
values, and that is most likely to occur when those values have been 
adequately represented.  This view of dispute resolution is not wholly 
inconsistent with strong responsiveness, but it does impose a natural 
condition:  The quality of representation must be adequate.137  When 
that condition is met, the nature of the adversarial structure will ensure 
that the court is informed of the public values implicated.138  But when 
it is not, a court runs a risk of imposing an undesirable resolution if it 
considers the case strictly as it is presented and framed by the 
participants.   
The problem in terms of caselaw production is similar.  
Tension between strong responsiveness and caselaw production has 
long been recognized.  As described by Chad Oldfather, the tension 
exists “for the simple reason that whatever rules the court generates as 
a result of its resolution of the specific dispute before it must be of the 
sort that can be applied to similar disputes in the future.  If the dispute 
before the court is somehow not representative of the broader category 
of disputes of which it is a part, or if the parties’ arguments fail to 
address issues that are critical to the formulation of a rule that must be 
applied across a range of future disputes, then strong responsiveness 
could lead to a decision that is based on an incomplete set of inputs 
and thus generate law that is inappropriate to the needs of future 
disputants.”139  Critics of strong responsiveness have pointed to this 
tension as a reason to abandon the norm altogether.140 Defenders of 
the norm have predictably been less categorical, but have recognized 
that deviations may be necessary where the potential for tension is 
particularly acute.141  The most commonly recognized deviation of 
this sort is in pure public law cases, but the potential for tension is also 
                                                          
137 In pure “public law” cases, even this condition may not be enough to permit 
resolution through responsiveness.  In these situations, the large number of public 
interests involved may not be adequately represented by the nominal parties to the 
dispute, and the court may therefore need to “construct a broader representational 
framework” to ensure that those interests are considered.  Fiss, supra note 136, at 26.   
138 Chayes, supra note 135, at 1308. 
139 See Oldfather, supra note 103, at 142.   
140 Eisenberg, supra note 129, at 413-14. 
141 Again, the classic deviation is in “public law” cases, which by their nature 
affect a large group of parties not directly involved in the dispute.  See Eisenberg, 
supra note 129, at 428 (concluding that in public law cases, “the judge may 
subordinate the norm of settling the dispute that has been put to him, on the basis of 
the issues put to him, in favor of the function of making rules that are responsive to 
public needs”). 
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acute where quality is low.  In Eisenberg’s formulation, “[t]he force of 
this norm [of strong responsiveness] may . . . vary according to the 
nature of the inquiry and the quality of the parties’ participation.”142   
The demands of both dispute resolution and caselaw 
production suggest that a quality condition must be met before a norm 
of strong responsiveness is imposed.  If that condition is not met, the 
court must make a choice.  One option is to adhere to the norm of 
strong responsiveness and to take on the risk that the outcome would 
be problematic in terms of caselaw production or dispute resolution (at 
least if the proper performance of those tasks is understood as 
encompassing some notion of public values).  The other option is to 
forego the norm of strong responsiveness in order to perform the 
dispute resolution and caselaw production functions effectively.  
When low quality appeals appear only periodically on a court’s 
docket, neither option is fraught with peril; occasional deviations from 
strong responsiveness are unlikely to generate systemic turbulence, 
and adherence to the norm even where the court views the case far 
differently is made palatable by the availability of non-precedential 
opinions.143   
But the situation may be quite different if the sophistication 
distortion operates to reduce the general quality of both the claims 
presented and the advocacy on behalf of those claims.  At a certain 
point, that denigration will threaten the court’s ability to perform its 
functions while remaining strongly responsive.  Faced with appeals of 
consistently low quality, a court may opt to hold fast to the norm of 
responsiveness, although one suspects that adherence would be purely 
formal.  In other words, the court may decide based on considerations 
not presented by the parties and then artificially frame the decision 
instead in the parties’ terms.  Such an approach would tend to preserve 
                                                          
142 Id. at 413 (emphasis added).  Peters also recognizes that his model of 
adjudication that calls for strong responsiveness as a guarantor of legitimacy is 
desirable only when the quality of representation has been adequate.  See Peters, 
supra note 131, at 376. 
143 Courts may choose to adhere to the litigants’ conception of a case even when 
they disagree with it if they feel that there is little to be gained by a deviation from 
the norm.  The availability of the nonprecedential opinion makes this artificial 
adherence relatively costless – it preserves legitimacy in the eyes of litigants without 
interfering with the court’s caselaw production function, precisely because the court 
chooses to forego its caselaw production function in appeals that it denotes as 
nonprecedential.  This approach is acceptable largely because the court is still able to 
perform its caselaw production function effectively while deciding the other appeals 
on its docket.      
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legitimacy in the eyes of participants, and it might even be viewed as 
satisfactory in terms of dispute resolution because the true resolution 
of the dispute would reflect public values.  But the disconnect between 
the true basis for the decision and its formal terms – or, put differently, 
the absence of judicial candor – is problematic in terms of the court’s 
caselaw production function, at least in the sense that it frustrates the 
ability of future litigants to predict how courts will behave going 
forward.144  An even more likely scenario is that courts faced with 
consistently low quality appeals would begin to systematically deviate 
from the norm of strong responsiveness.  But such deviations would 
come at a price.  Parties involved in disputes would begin to view the 
court’s resolution as illegitimate if the court’s output does not reflect 
their input.  More importantly, the rules created by the court may be 
viewed as less legitimate by external actors because they do not grow 
out of a representational process.     
The sophistication distortion is similar to the distortion created 
by non-uniform panel predictability in the sense that both have the 
potential to create serious jurisprudential problems in the extreme 
case.   But the two are also similar in the sense that the extreme case is 
very unlikely.  In terms of the sophistication distortion, the extreme 
case is created not by an abundance of low quality appeals, but by the 
dearth of high quality ones.  So long as a court is presented with a 
sufficient number of high quality appeals, it can use those cases to 
satisfy the demands of caselaw production while remaining responsive 
to litigant participation.  As for the low quality appeals, it can simply 
minimize them by issuing narrow (and, if the mechanism is available, 
nonprecedential) opinions.  Put differently, the extreme case will arise 
only if the rule works extremely well among the pool of sophisticated 
litigants – so well that cases involving those litigants become scarce.  
That is unlikely because of the existence of the other intractable 
barriers discussed in Part II.  For example, so long as a minimum 
condition of unpredictability among the panels is met, the early 
                                                          
144 See Richard A. Posner, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 
147 (1996) (“Prolixity and lack of candor are not mere inelegances in judicial 
opinions.  They increase the time required of reading . . . [a]nd they reduce the 
opinion’s usefulness as a guide to what the judges are likely to do in future cases.”).  
The lack of candor may create additional problems in terms of the court’s legitimacy 
or integrity.  For defenses of a requirement of judicial candor in these terms, see, 
e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:  Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1995); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial 
Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 401-02 (1989).   
 
 
 
 
 Early Panel Announcement 55 
announcement policy will not winnow the pool of sophisticated 
appeals to a problematic level.  The court may find itself dealing with 
a relatively larger percentage of low quality appeals, but it will avoid 
large scale problems of legitimacy and caselaw production. 
 
C.  The Motivation Distortion 
  
 A final distortion stems from the fact that cases involving 
litigants who are interested in a judgment per se may be relatively less 
responsive to the introduction of new information regarding likely 
outcome.  For litigants who view the judgment as instrumental – for 
example, as a way to extract or withhold money from the other party – 
panel announcement may offer a valuable cue and permit settlement.  
But this is so because these litigants view a reliable prediction about 
the judgment as the functional equivalent of the judgment itself.  In 
contrast, litigants who are interested in the judgment per se do not 
view the two as interchangeable, and they are therefore less likely to 
respond to panel announcement.   
The motivational differences between these two types of 
litigants should mean that those seeking judgments per se are 
overrepresented among the pool of cases that proceed to oral 
argument, even absent an early announcement procedure.  But that 
overrepresentation will be even more pronounced after such a 
procedure is introduced.  If these two types of litigants are evenly 
distributed among cases, the overrepresentation does not matter much.  
But one suspects that the distribution is not even.  Rather, litigants 
seeking judgments per se may be overrepresented in certain classes of 
cases (employment discrimination, say).145  If that is so, then the 
motivation distortion can affect the content mix of the oral argument 
pool. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
145 For a discussion about how the selection of cases at the trial level is affected 
by differences in plaintiffs’ “taste for litigiousness,” and more specifically how those 
differences may relate to the subject matter of the dispute, see Theodore Eisenberg & 
Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis:  Case Selection and Resolution, 
28 RAND J. ECON. S92 (1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The theoretical case for a settlement effect generated by early 
panel announcement is based on a straightforward model of cue and 
response.  The court provides an informational cue to litigants when it 
discloses panel composition, and it assumes that some litigants will 
seek settlement in response because they will perceive the information 
as relevant to the appeal’s likely outcome.  In practice, the cue and 
response mechanism appears to be operating in some cases, although 
not in overwhelming fashion.  This article has attempted to accomplish 
two goals:  to explore barriers that prevent the mechanism from having 
greater effect, and to explore ways that those barriers make the 
mechanism’s limited effect non-random. 
 In terms of barriers, some are created by weaknesses in the 
cue, while others are created by weaknesses in litigants’ ability to 
interpret and respond to the cue.  Recognizing that these barriers exist 
could lead the way to procedural modifications designed to alleviate 
them, but in this case effective yet acceptable modifications are 
difficult to imagine.  Improving effectiveness would require the court 
to embrace or acknowledge the attitudinal model, and that almost 
certainly represents an unacceptable cost.  Instead, the barriers seem 
intractable, and their intractability suggests various distortions 
generated by the procedure’s limited effect.   
 So what does all of this say about whether an early 
announcement procedure is worthwhile?  The answer to that question 
depends to some extent on further empirical study of the contours of 
the various distortions described here, and to some extent on a 
subjective evaluation about the value or danger of those distortions.  
For my part, I am doubtful that the procedure is effective in terms of 
decreasing the court’s overall workload, although it may create a 
welcome shift in the allocation of that workload away from judges and 
toward the court’s administrative staff.  Moreover, at the margins it 
may well promote panels that are more diverse, and that seems a 
benefit worth the costs of increased pandering during argument and an 
increase in unsophisticated appeals.  But my primary intention here is 
not to resolve that question definitively; rather, it is to suggest that a 
full understanding of the procedure’s tradeoffs is considerably more 
complicated than a simple choice between attorney pandering and 
decreased caseload. 
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 This connects to a final, larger point.  As the appellate caseload 
continues to rise, and as other mechanisms for dealing with the 
caseload crunch come under pressure,146 courts can be expected to 
consider new ways that they might exercise control over internal rules 
and procedures to procure relief.  But such efforts are fraught with 
peril.  Maneuvering within the space created by local rulemaking 
authority in an effort to generate caseload reductions can be a 
dangerous business with jurisprudential implications. Indirect 
maneuvers such as cue and response mechanisms are particularly 
problematic because they are not self-executing; instead, the court 
must rely on litigants to receive the cue, process it accurately, and 
react to it rationally.   But if parties do not receive, process and react 
uniformly – and it is a near-sure bet that they do not – then the court’s 
decision to provide information alters the pool of cases that remain.  In 
short, courts should think carefully about how the introduction of local 
rules and procedures, and particularly those that depend on litigant 
response, may ultimately affect the cases they hear and the way they 
decide them.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
146 As mentioned supra at note 10, the oft-used technique of filing a short 
unpublished opinion to dispose of straightforward appeals will lose some of its luster 
when the new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 goes into effect later this 
year.  In addition, the Supreme Court has recently been creating pressure on lower 
courts to use abstention doctrines – which can be used by courts to dispose of cases 
in certain contexts – more sparingly.  See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. ____ 
(2006) (narrowing the probate exception to federal jurisdiction); ExxonMobil Corp. 
v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (reading the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine narrowly). 
